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ABSTRACT 
Childcare (In)stability and Household (In)stability Among Low-Income Families 
Elizabeth L. Doran 
This dissertation includes three papers examining role of childcare stability in the lives of 
families, focusing on low-income households. Paper one considers the relationship between 
household instability and childcare instability for parents with young children in New York City. 
Paper two examines the relationship between universal pre-kindergarten in New York City and 
education and employment outcomes for parents. Finally, paper three explores the effect of 
federal childcare subsidies on education and employment outcomes for parents.  
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V. PREFACE 
This dissertation includes three papers that examine childcare instability. The first paper 
provides descriptive evidence on household factors associated with childcare instability, while 
the second and third papers examine policy changes that provide greater stability to families and 
the impact of those policies on parental outcomes. 
Childcare stability is important to the functioning and development of children and their 
parents, and more stable childcare arrangements are linked to more favorable individual and 
household outcomes. In particular, low-income families tend to experience instability in 
childcare arrangements and also experience larger benefits from stabilized care. A large literature 
has examined the link between childcare stability and child and parent outcomes, but some 
dimensions of childcare instability are unclear: we do not yet fully understand the relationship 
between household instability and childcare stability, and we do not know how recent policy 
changes that are designed to promote stability have affected parental outcomes. These are the 
topics with which this dissertation is concerned. 
My first paper, “Household Factors Associated with Childcare Instability Among New 
York Families,” examines the relationship between childcare changes and household changes, 
including losing a job, starting a new job, residential moves for both positive and negative 
reason, and having someone move out of the household. I find that families are at greater risk of 
a change in childcare after experiencing a job loss, a residential move for negative reasons, or 
having someone move out of the household; starting a new job and moving for positive reasons 
are not significantly linked to childcare change. This analysis suggests that it is not solely 
household changes that are linked to childcare instability, but rather negative household changes. 
While numerous factors contribute to childcare stability, these results indicate that arrangements 
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that can be responsive to the unique and dynamic needs of families are likely to provide greater 
continuity of care; this may be particularly important for low-income families, who tend to 
experience more frequent negative changes. My subsequent two papers look more closely at how 
childcare policies can support low-income families. 
My second paper, “The Effects of Universal Pre-Kindergarten on Parent Education and 
Employment,” provides evidence on the effect of the recent implementation of universal pre-
kindergarten in New York City on parental employment and education. I find no effect on 
parents’ enrollment in schooling or in labor force engagement, although I do find a sizeable 
increase in earnings. Subgroup analysis reveals that this increase in earnings is attributable to 
increases by families not in poverty and by married or cohabiting parents. These results suggest 
that while the program may improve earnings for traditionally more advantaged parents, the 
program does not improve employment or education outcomes for parents in poverty and single 
parents. Planned improvements and expansions to the program may contribute to more favorable 
future effects for these traditionally disadvantaged groups. 
Finally, my third paper, “The Effects of Lengthening Childcare Subsidy Eligibility on 
Parental Labor Market and Education Outcomes,” explores the effect of the 2014 Congressional 
reauthorization of the Child Care and Development program, which provides childcare subsidies 
to low-income families, on parental employment and education. I find that longer subsidy 
eligibility periods increased parental enrollment in school by 3 percentage points, and 
concurrently decreased parental work by approximately the same amount. This result suggests 
that longer eligibility periods facilitate parental human capital investments: when parents have 
longer periods of assured stable childcare, they are able to enroll in educational programs. This 
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result also has implications for long-term economic mobility, as increased parental education 
may translate into greater household earnings down the road. 
Overall, findings from these papers suggest a linkage between negative household 
changes and childcare instability, as well as role for social policy in supporting families in 
achieving more stable childcare arrangements. In particular, targeted childcare programs not only 
may provide stability for low-income families, but they also may allow parents to invest in 









Nearly four in ten children—and substantially more low-income children—experience 
childcare instability each year (Grobe et al., 2017; Tran and Weinraub, 2006). This instability is 
linked to a variety of negative outcomes for children and parents. While many families 
experience childcare instability as a result of the characteristics of childcare itself, other families 
experience childcare instability associated with various types of household instability. The link 
between household instability and childcare instability, however, is not well understood. This 
study uses 2017-2018 data from the Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, a new panel survey of 
New York City families with young children. I use survival analysis methods to examine the 
relationship between childcare changes and household changes, including losing a job, starting a 
new job, residential moves for both positive and negative reason, having someone move out of 
the household, and the end of a romantic relationship. I find that approximately a third of all 
households experienced a childcare change over a nine-month period. Cox proportional hazards 
models indicate that families are at greater risk of a change in childcare after experiencing a job 
loss, a residential move for negative reasons, or having someone move out of the household. 
Childcare arrangements that can be responsive to the unique and dynamic needs of families are 
likely to provide greater continuity of care; this may be particularly important for low-income 




Childcare arrangements are a critical component in the lives of working families, with 
estimates indicating that the majority of households with young children are engaged with some 
form of nonparental care (Hipp et al., 2017; Laughlin, 2013). There are numerous types of 
childcare arrangements, ranging from center-based care to daycare in someone else’s home, from 
paid care in a family’s own home to care with a relative. Ideally, families would be able to access 
and afford a childcare arrangement that is stable and well-suited to their unique needs. However, 
for many families, instability in childcare is common, with arrangements that are inconsistent 
and/or change frequently. A large body of literature indicates that unstable childcare is 
detrimental to children and to their parents, and that characteristics of childcare itself frequently 
are linked to these changes (Chase et al., 2005; Chaudry, 2004; Laughlin, 2013; Lowe et al., 
2005).  
Household changes also have been linked to changes in childcare (Chaudry, 2004; 
Huston et al., 2002), although these factors are less well understood. In particular, there is limited 
evidence on the interconnection of multiple domains of instability that households might face—
such as employment, residential, and household composition changes—and instability of 
childcare arrangements. As household instability is seldom limited to a single domain, 
particularly in the lives of low-income families, it is important to begin to fill this gap in the 
literature (Sandstrom and Huerta, 2013). 
This study uses a new panel study of families with young children in New York City to 
examine the relationship between household changes and childcare changes. I use survival 
analysis methods to exploit the temporally ordered nature of the panel data, estimating the risk of 
a childcare change in three-month increments. I find that approximately a third of families 
experienced a childcare change from the baseline survey to the end of the subsequent nine-month 
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period; among families in deep poverty (less than 50 percent of the poverty line), more than 40 
percent experienced a childcare change. Cox proportional hazards models indicate that families 
are at greater risk of a change in childcare after experiencing a job loss, a residential move for 
negative reasons, or a change in family structure (having someone move out of the household). I 
find that families who experience positive changes, including starting a new job and a residential 
move for positive reasons, do not have an increased risk of childcare change. This analysis 
suggests that, particularly for low-income families, childcare programs and policies should take 
extra care to support families experiencing negative life events, with the goal of minimizing the 
risk of childcare change simultaneous to other household changes. 
 
Background 
Childcare instability is a widely-studied topic without a single widely-agreed upon 
definition. In general, researchers tend to explore three types of childcare instability (Adams and 
Rohacek, 2010). First, and perhaps most common in the literature, is the ending of the primary 
childcare arrangement. Prior studies have assessed the frequency with which the primary 
childcare arrangement changes, the number of primary arrangements a child experiences in a 
given timeframe, and how frequently a child starts a new primary care arrangement (de Schipper 
et al., 2004; Loeb et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2005). Second is the study of simultaneous multiple 
arrangements, in which children are cared for in several different settings in the same timeframe. 
(Morrissey, 2009; Pilarz and Hill, 2014). Third, researchers have examined provider turnover 
within a given childcare arrangement (de Schipper et al., 2004). All of these types of instability 
measure different dimensions of childcare continuity, and all are associated with the wellbeing of 
children and families. 
 7 
Regardless of the definition of childcare instability used, estimates indicate that it is 
prevalent. A nationally-representative study estimated that nearly 40 percent of infants will 
experience a change in childcare between 6 and 15 months of age (Tran and Weinraub, 2006). 
Focusing particularly on disadvantaged children, 70 percent of low-income families using 
childcare subsidies will change childcare arrangements at least once in a given year (Grobe et al., 
2008). Ethnographic research indicates that between 30 and 60 percent of low-income families 
experience multiple primary childcare situations in a three-year period (Chaudry, 2004; Lowe et 
al., 2005).  
Not only is instability in childcare arrangement common, but it has important 
implications both for children and parents. Childcare arrangement stability has been linked to a 
host of child development outcomes, including the creation of a secure attachment to caregivers 
(Howes and Hamilton, 1992), externalizing and internalizing behavior (de Schipper et al., 2004; 
Pilarz and Hill, 2014), cognitive and social skills (Ansari and Winsler, 2013), language (Tran and 
Weinraub, 2006), and overall wellbeing (de Schipper et al., 2004). Childcare stability is 
particularly important for vulnerable groups of children. Infant and toddlers, children from low-
income families, and children who have instability in other domains of life may be more likely to 
face negative developmental outcomes linked to unstable childcare (Adams and Rohacek, 2010). 
A large body of research also demonstrates a clear relationship between childcare 
instability and parental employment, which are often jointly-made decisions (Chaudry and 
Henly, 2010).  Mothers who have children engaged in unstable childcare tend to experience 
unstable employment (Blau and Robins, 1998; Forry and Hofferth, 2011; Ha and Meyer, 2010; 
Hofferth and Collins, 2000; Holzer et al., 2004; Mason and Kuhlthau, 2017). Further, this 
relationship has been found both for middle- and high-income mothers (Hofferth and Collins, 
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2000) as well as for low-income mothers (Baum, 2002; Gordon et al., 2008). It is notable that the 
direction of this relationship is not always clear or consistent throughout the literature, as it is 
particularly difficult to quantitatively identify causality when studying instability (Adams and 
Rohacek, 2010; Sandstrom and Huerta, 2013). However, qualitative analysis has found a direct 
pathway from employment instability to childcare instability, particularly among low-income 
families (Chaudry, 2004; Scott et al., 2005). 
The reasons that families experience childcare instability are vast and complex. Existing 
literature points to two primary reasons for childcare instability: characteristics of the childcare 
itself and various types of household instability.  
Among the factors associated with childcare itself, the high price of childcare is a main 
reason for instability (Laughlin, 2013). While some low-income families do receive childcare 
subsidies to offset some or all of the cost of care, instability in subsidy receipt is common and 
subsidy receipt is often linked to exiting a care arrangement (Grobe et al., 2017, 2008; Henly et 
al., 2017). Families also may voluntarily end a care arrangement if they do not believe their child 
is being provided with high-quality care or due to a disagreement with a provider (Chase et al., 
2005; Chaudry, 2004; Lowe et al., 2005). Providers may also choose to end an arrangement, 
which is more common among family providers, or providers may only be able to provide 
temporary care (Chase et al., 2005). 
In addition to childcare-related factors, household-level factors also contribute to 
childcare instability. This is particularly true for families participating in center-based care 
(Huston et al., 2002). In describing the dynamics of childcare spells among 42 low-income 
families in New York City, Chaudry (2004) finds that characteristics of childcare itself account 
for the majority of exits, but that a large proportion of families exit a childcare arrangement for 
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factors unrelated to childcare: 12 percent of families exited a childcare arrangement due to 
employment instability, 9 percent exited due to housing instability, and 8 percent exited due to 
changes in family structure.  
While previous literature highlights the strong link between childcare instability and 
parental employment, we know little about the link between childcare instability and changes in 
housing or changes in family structure. However, these domains not only are important in the 
lives and wellbeing of families, but theory also indicates a likely pathway between instability in 
housing and/or family structure and instability in childcare arrangement (Henly et al., 2017; 
Krafft et al., 2017).  
When considering housing instability, researchers classify it as either voluntary, in which 
the household moves as a deliberate choice (such as moving to a better neighborhood or larger 
home), or forced, in which the household moves for a reason largely out of their control (such as 
a rent increase or an eviction) (Desmond, 2016). Both of these types of moves may be associated 
with childcare change, as families may relocate childcare arrangements simultaneously with a 
residential relocation (Desmond, 2016; Desmond and Gershenson, 2016). It is also possible that 
families may experience residential change in order to be more accessible to existing childcare 
arrangements, although this has not yet been explored in the literature. 
We can situate the link between family structure and childcare instability in a vast 
literature indicating that family structure in childhood is one of the most important determinants 
of outcomes throughout the life course. McLanahan (2004) terms the variation in outcomes 
associated with family structure “diverging destinies:” children born to married parents tend to 
fare far better than children born to non-married parents in a variety of domains, and have more 
household stability. Relatedly, being raised by a single mother is strongly linked to 
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intergenerational income persistence (Chetty et al., 2014) and to negative outcomes in the 
domains of child well-being and achievement (McLanahan et al., 2013). Frequent transitions are 
especially prevalent amongst non-married households, as single parents may be involved with 
multiple romantic partners through a child’s life (Lundberg et al., 2016). These types of 
household churn examined in the literature may result in cascading instability. For example, 
upon ending a relationship a household may experience a residential transition, which may be 
accompanied by transitions in childcare and/or employment. 
This literature highlights the interwoven nature of instability in the lives of low-income 
families, yet few studies examine the interconnectedness of multiple types of household 
instability and childcare instability (Sandstrom and Huerta, 2013). It is necessary to explore 
instability in multiple domains together in order to more comprehensively understand how 
complex family dynamics influence childcare. Yet this is a difficult task, as data that captures 
measures of multiple types of instability is scarce, and often sample sizes are small. The present 
study contributes to and extends the existing literature by using novel data to analyze the 
relationship between multiple types of household instability and childcare changes. 
 
Data and Measures 
I use data from the Early Childhood Poverty Tracker (ECPT), a panel survey launched in 
2017 by Robin Hood and Columbia University. The ECPT follows young children living in New 
York City with surveys approximately every three months. The majority of the sample is drawn 
from NYC Kids, a telephone survey of randomly-selected households with children under age 
four conducted by the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. NYC Kids respondents 
with children under age four were invited to participate in the ECPT, and 1,402 participated in 
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the ECPT baseline survey. Part of the ECPT sample also is drawn from the ongoing Poverty 
Tracker panel study, which is a partnership between Robin Hood and Columbia University; 138 
parents from the Poverty Tracker study with children under age four participated in the ECPT 
baseline survey. 
At the baseline survey, 1,540 parents identified a “focal child” who was between the ages 
of 0 and 35 months old in June 2017, or who was born the subsequent 12 months.1 Parents and 
focal children are surveyed approximately every three months for up to four years, and a core set 
of repeated questions about the parent, child, and household are fielded at every follow-up wave. 
More detailed surveys are administered at baseline and every 12 months thereafter, which 
provide comprehensive measures of poverty and material hardship. This analysis uses data from 
the baseline survey and three subsequent waves at three months (n=1,287), six months 
(n=1,223), and nine months (n=1,154) after baseline. The analytic sample consists of 
respondents who appeared in all survey waves (n=1,124). 
This panel design with repeated questions is necessary for analysis of childcare instability 
and the factors that contribute to it. By surveying families approximately every three months 
throughout the year, the ECPT provides insight into the changing dynamics within households. 
Many families will experience changes over time, and this survey not only captures repeated 
measures but also provides temporal ordering of these events. 
Critical for this analysis, detailed measures of changes in childcare arrangements (for the 
focal child), parental employment, housing, and family structure are asked every three months. 
Respondents are asked whether they had a change in childcare arrangement in the previous three 
 
1 For more information on the ECPT study design and baseline profile, see Neckerman et al. 
(2019). 
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months, which allows me to identify childcare instability. Employment measures include 
whether someone in the household lost a job or started a new job in the previous three months. 
Housing measures ask respondents if they have moved in the previous three months and, if so, 
the reason for the move. For those who report a move, I categorize moves into two groups. 
Positive moves—which roughly correspond to voluntary moves—are moves that allow the 
parent to be closer to work/have an easire commute or allow the family to move to a more 
affordable home. Negative moves—which roughly correspond to forced moves—are those in 
which the family deemed the neighborhood dangerous, the landlord raised the rent, the landlord 
refused to fix things in the home, the landlord was harassing a member of the household, the 
building went into foreclosure, the building was condemned, the household missed a rent 
payment and expect to be evicted, or the household was formally evicted. Finally, family 
structure measures include whether someone moved out of the household in the prior three 
months.  
I also control for a variety of parent, child, and household characteristics. For the parent, I 
control for gender (binary, where 1=female), race (mutually exclusive binary categories for 
white, black, Asian, other, and Hispanic), and educational attainment (mutually exclusive binary 
categories for less than high school, high school diploma or GED, some college or associate 
degree, and bachelor’s degree or higher). For the focal child, I control for continuous age and 
gender (binary, where 1=female). For the household, I control for NYC borough (mutually 
exclusive binary categories for Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island), the 
continuous number of adults in the household, and household poverty (mutually exclusive binary 
categories for less than 50 percent of poverty, 50 to 100 percent of poverty, 101 to 200 percent of 
poverty, and more than 200 percent of poverty, measured by the Supplemental Poverty 
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Measure). Finally, in some models I control for the weekly continuous cost of childcare and the 
type of childcare the focal child is enrolled in at each wave: center-based (including pre-
kindergarten, Head Start, preschool, nursery, and daycare), family daycare (paid in someone 
else’s home), paid babysitter or nanny in the family’s own home, and free or paid care with a 
relative. As childcare characteristics may be endogenous, I present models both with and without 
these covariates in order to align with previous literature on childcare instabilty (Davis et al., 
2017; Henly et al., 2017). 
 
Methods 
I use survival analysis methods to understand household factors related to childcare 
instability. First, I present graphs showing the Kaplan-Meier estimator for the sample on average 
and for various subgroups within the sample. The Kaplan-Meier estimator, which is a descriptive 
survival methods that does not include any explanatory variables, shows the probability of 
survival (no childcare change) or failure (childcare change) at the end of each three-month period 
in which the ECPT surveys were conducted (Allison, 2014; Davis et al., 2017).  
I next use a multivariate Cox proportional hazards model to identify factors associated 
with changes in childcare. This method follows previous literature on childcare instability (Davis 
et al., 2017; Henly et al., 2017) and is appropriate because the ECPT data includes both time-
varying measures and is right-censored: I do not observe the end of the childcare arrangement for 
all families during the study period. Cox proportional hazards models estimate the hazard of 
childcare change at time t in household k (Allison, 1982), such that 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑋) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp⁡(∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 )         (1), 
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where ℎ0(𝑡) represents the baseline hazard of childcare change and 𝑋𝑘 is a vector of household 
covariates, including employment change, housing change, and family structure change, as well 
as parent, child, household, and, in some models, childcare characteristics. I report results as both 
coefficient estimates and as hazard ratios, which can be interpreted as the risk of childcare 
change relative to baseline. Hazard ratios less than 1 indicate a decrease in the hazard of 
childcare change, while hazard ratios greater than 1 indicate an increase in the hazard of 
childcare change. 
As ECPT data is measured in discrete intervals, survival analysis methods must 
incorporate the handling of ties that arise from multiple events occurring in the same interval. 
Both the Efron partial likelihood method and the Breslow marginal likelihood method are widely 
used. Both methods produce results similar in magnitude and significance in my analysis; I 
present estimates using the Efron method, with Breslow estimates shown in the appendix. The 
Efron method is considered to be more accurate than the Breslow method when there are a non-
trivial number of ties, though estimates may be biased toward zero with both methods (Allison, 
2014, 1982). Further, as the data is pooled, with multiple observations per household (one for 
each survey period), I use Huber-White clustered standard errors to account for statistical 
dependence, where all models are clustered on the individual level. All estimates are weighted 
using household-level survey weights to be statistically to be representative of households with 
children born in New York state and living in New York City.  
 The proportional hazards assumptions are not restrictive, as the model does not have any 
specific functional form (Allison, 2014). However, it is important to test the proportionality of 
the estimated hazards, as the models assume that each covariate has the same effect across all 
time points. I estimate Schoenfeld residuals to test this assumption; residuals of hazards that are 
 15 
proportional should not be statistically significantly correlated with time (Schoenfeld, 1982). To 
be conservative in my assessment of the proportionality assumption, I use a high threshold for 
statistical significance: I assume that any residuals that are correlated with time at the p < 0.10 
significance level fail to meet the proportionality assumption. The primary reason that hazards 
are not proportional tends to be an underlying interaction with time; as such, time-varying 
covariates often fail to meet the proportional hazards assumption (Allison, 2014). To correct this 
failure, time-varying covariates can be interacted with time to specify varying risks at different 
times throughout the three-month survey periods. As such, I also present models interacting the 




Descriptive Characteristics of Childcare Instability 
Table 1 presents characteristics of childcare instability among the full sample and 
separately among households that experienced no change in childcare and groups that 
experienced at least one change in childcare at any follow-up survey wave. The average 
household in the sample experienced 0.4 childcare changes between the baseline survey and the 
nine-month survey wave, while the average household that experienced any childcare change 
had 1.3 changes; approximately a third of all households experienced a childcare change. 
Households that experienced a childcare change had significantly greater rates of job loss, job 
starts, positive and negative moves, and having someone move out of the household, as 
compared to households with no childcare change. Turning to parent characteristics, Table 1 
indicates no difference in parental gender or race across households with and without childcare 
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changes. Parents with a high school degree or less had a higher rate of no childcare changes, 
while parents with a college degree or higher had a greater incidence of childcare changes. 
Examining child and household characteristics, I find no significant differences between groups 
who did and did not experience a childcare change. Finally, turning to childcare characteristics, I 
find no significant difference in weekly cost of childcare between groups, but I find that children 
in center-based care experienced lower rates of childcare change and children in family daycare 
experienced higher rates of childcare change, as compared to their counterparts. 
Table 2 presents rates of household changes by poverty status. As literature on family 
instability indicates that households in poverty are more likely to experience all types of 
instability, I examine whether this is true for my analytic sample. I find that the average family in 
deep poverty (less than 50 percent of the poverty line) experienced 0.5 childcare changes during 
the study period, while higher-income families experienced approximately 0.4 changes. Further, 
41 percent of families in deep poverty experienced a childcare change; this is nearly double the 
childcare change rate of families over 200 percent of poverty (23.8 percent). Families under 100 
percent of poverty had higher rates of job loss than those over this threshold; conversely, families 
under 100 percent of poverty had lower rates of job starts and positive moves than their higher-
income counterparts. I find that families in deep poverty had the lowest rate of negative moves, 
while families at 50 to 100 percent of poverty had the highest rate. The share of households that 
had someone move out is roughly even across all groups. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates from baseline (month zero) 
through the month nine follow-up survey wave. These survival estimates indicate the probability 
in a given three-month period of continuing in the same childcare arrangement until the next 
three-month period, adjusting for right-censoring. Figure 1 presents the Kaplan-Meier estimates 
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for the full sample, indicating the continual high probability of not experiencing a change in 
childcare arrangement between baseline and nine months afterward. At three months, there is 
approximately a 90 percent chance of being in the same childcare arrangement; at six months, 
the chance of being in the same childcare arrangement decreases to 79 percent; and at nine 
months, there is a 65 percent chance of being in the same childcare arrangement. 
Figure 2 presents Kaplan-Meier estimates for various subgroups. These results largely 
align with the household characteristics by childcare change presented in Table 1. When 
comparing survival estimates based on type of childcare arrangement at baseline (top left panel), 
I find that children enrolled in family daycare have the greatest probability of changing a 
childcare arrangement, while children in center-based are least likely to changing a childcare 
arrangements 9 months after baseline.  The top right panel of Figure 2 shows no differences in 
likelihood of changing a childcare arrangement by household poverty status. The bottom left 
panel shows that male focal children are slightly more likely to change a childcare arrangement 
than female focal children. Finally, the bottom right panel indicates that older children (three 
years of age) are less likely to change a childcare arrangement three to six months after baseline, 
as compared to younger children, but children of all ages have approximately the same 
probability of childcare change six to nine months after baseline.  
Cox Proportional Hazards Models 
Table 3 shows base Cox proportional hazards models using the Efron method to break 
ties (see appendix Table A1 for estimates using the Breslow method). Columns 1 and 2 present 
coefficients and hazards ratios, respectively, for a model that excludes childcare characteristic 
covariates; Columns 3 and 4 present coefficients and hazards ratios for a model including these 
variables. While the magnitude of the estimates changes in the different models, the significance 
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and direction of risk remains the same. In general, controlling for childcare characteristics 
decreases the influence of negative household changes (losing a job, moving for negative 
reasons, and having someone move out), while increasing the influence of positive household 
changes (starting a new job and moving for positive reasons). When excluding childcare 
characteristics, families experiencing a job loss had an increased risk of childcare change of 97 
percent, as compared to families without a job loss; this risk only increases by 52 percent once 
childcare characteristics are accounted for. As compared to families who did not have a 
household member start a new job, families experiencing the start of a new job had an increased 
risk of 64 percent when excluding childcare characteristics, and accounting for childcare 
characteristics increases this risk to 73 percent. I find no significant link between childcare 
change and experiencing a positive move. Further, the risk of childcare change roughly doubled 
for families who moved for negative reasons, as compared to families who did not move for 
negative reasons, when not accounting for childcare characteristics; adding childcare 
characteristics to the model results in a 72 percent risk increase. In families in which someone 
moved out of the household, as compared to families in which this event did not occur, the risk 
of childcare change increased by 77 percent, when accounting for childcare characteristics, and 
by 49 percent, when excluding childcare characteristics. Further, I find that parents with a high 
school degree (or equivalent) or less have a greater risk of childcare instability than parents with 
at least a college degree; parental, child, and household characteristics are otherwise largely 
insignificant. Notably, I find that the weekly cost of care as no sizable link to childcare change 
(i.e., it is a precisely-estimated zero) and that the type of care is not significantly related to 
childcare change. 
 19 
 Table 4 presents the Schoenfeld residuals from the models in Table 3, which test the 
proportional hazards assumption. As expected, I find that the household change time-varying 
covariates—job loss, job state, positive move, negative move, and having someone move out—
are significantly correlated with time. These covariates therefore violate the proportional hazards 
assumption. 
 In order to account for this violation of the proportional hazards assumption, I estimate 
Cox proportional hazards models in which time-varying covariates are interacted with time. 
These results are shown in Table 5 (see appendix Table A2 for comparable models using the 
Breslow method to break ties). Similar to results in Table 3, I find that families who experienced 
a job loss or who moved for negative reasons had an increased risk of childcare change. 
Additionally, I find a small (less than 1 percent) increase in the risk of childcare change for 
families in which someone moved out. However, when accounting for the significant interaction 
between having someone move out and time, I find that the risk of childcare change more than 
doubles every three months after someone moves out of a household. Unlike the base Cox 
models shown in Table 3, these estimates indicate no significant association between childcare 
change and starting a new job; as with the base models, the time-varying models continue to 
indicate no significant link between childcare change and moving for positive reasons. Finally, I 
find the same overall pattern of significance and magnitude of parental, child, household, and 
childcare characteristic covariates. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Nearly four in ten children—and substantially more low-income children—experience 
childcare instability each year (Grobe et al., 2017; Tran and Weinraub, 2006). This instability is 
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linked to a variety of negative outcomes for children and parents. While many families 
experience childcare instability as a result of the characteristics of childcare itself, other families 
experience childcare instability associated with various types of household instability. The link 
between household instability and childcare instability, however, is not well understood. This 
study uses 2017-2018 data from the Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, a new panel survey of 
New York City families with young children. I use survival analysis methods to examine the 
relationship between childcare changes and household changes, including losing a job, starting a 
new job, residential moves for both positive and negative reason, and having someone move out 
of the household. I find that approximately a third of all households experienced a childcare 
change over a nine-month period. Cox proportional hazards models indicate that families are at 
greater risk of a change in childcare after experiencing a job loss, a residential move for negative 
reasons, or having someone move out of the household. 
 This study is, to my knowledge, the first quantitative analysis of multiple dimensions of 
household instability in relation to childcare instability. It is striking that the household changes 
linked to childcare instability— experiencing a job loss, a residential move for negative reasons, 
or having someone move out of the household—tend to be ones that occur in negative situations. 
Conversely, the household changes with no significant association with childcare instability—
starting a new job and a residential move for positive reasons—are ones that are generally 
associated with positive life events. This analysis suggests that it is not household changes in 
general that are linked to childcare instability, but rather negative household changes. Families 
may be better able to buffer children from childcare changes when faced with positive changes, 
whereas they may be less able to do so when faced with negative changes. In addition, models 
accounting for childcare characteristics decrease the risk of childcare change associated with 
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negative household changes, while increasing the risk of childcare change associated with 
positive household changes (as compared to models not controlling for these characteristics). 
This may indicate that some of the risk of childcare change associated with household changes is 
attributable to childcare cost and type, as suggested by prior literature (Adams and Rohacek, 
2010; Chaudry, 2004). 
While numerous factors related to the care arrangement itself contribute to childcare 
stability—such as provider dependability and quality—arrangements that can be responsive to 
the unique and dynamic needs of families are likely to provide greater continuity of care; this 
may be particularly important for families in poverty—and especially those in deep poverty—
who I find experience more frequent childcare and household changes. This finding aligns with 
previous research, which suggests that low-income households tend to experience greater 
instability (Adams and Rohacek, 2010). Childcare programs and policies should take extra care 
to support families experiencing negative life events, with the goal of minimizing the risk of 
childcare change simultaneous to other household changes. 
This analysis should be viewed in light of several limitations. First, this analysis should 
not be viewed as causal. While temporally-ordered data allows me to conduct an informative 
analysis using survival analysis methods, it does not allow me to definitively determine whether 
the factors I consider directly or indirectly caused a childcare change. Additionally, my results 
may be biased toward zero. Ideally, data used in survival analysis methods would be fully 
continuous, so that variables measure the exact moment an event occurred; in reality, data is 
often obtained in discrete intervals. As such, analytical techniques—most commonly, the Efron 
partial likelihood method and the Breslow marginal likelihood method—are necessary to break 
any ties that occur from having more than one event occur during an interval. These methods 
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tend to produce results biased toward zero (Allison, 2014, 1982), and the results presented here 
may suffer from this bias. Finally, two data limitations should be noted. First, this data is 
representative only of families with young children living in New York City; extrapolations 
should not be made to families in other areas of the country or nationwide, particularly since 
families in New York City may face different constraints (such as the high cost of housing) 
relative to families elsewhere. Second, I am unable to conduct subgroup analysis. While 
literature and theory indicate that different households may respond differently to household 
changes in employment, housing, and family structure, stratifying the full sample into subgroups 
dramatically reduces sample size and results in inadequately powered models. 
 Future research should use ECPT data to examine whether families who enrolled in the 
city’s universal pre-kindergarten program experienced different risks of childcare change than 
families not enrolled. Universal care may provide more stability in childcare, as it may address 
characteristics of care itself that lead to childcare exits—even in the midst of the other types of 
household instability examined in this paper. However, the current ECPT data set does not have 
a large enough sample of children enrolled in universal pre-kindergarten to conduct this analysis 
with sufficient statistical power; once more ECPT families have children who are age-eligible for 




Figure 1—1: Kaplan-Meier survivor function 
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Table 1—1. Household characteristics by childcare change 
 





Household Changes    
Childcare changes (#) 0.411 0.000 1.311*** 
 (0.679) (0.000) (0.539) 
Childcare changes (% of sample) 0.353 0.000 1.000 
 (0.464) (0.000) (0.000) 
Job loss (%) 0.107 0.080 0.167*** 
 (0.310) (0.272) (0.373) 
Job start (%) 0.277 0.221 0.399*** 
 (0.525) (0.464) (0.621) 
Positive move (%) 0.041 0.033 0.060* 
 (0.199) (0.179) (0.237)*** 
Negative move (%) 0.070 0.049 0.116 
 (0.255) (0.216) (0.321) 
Someone moved out (%) 0.051 0.042 0.072* 
 (0.221) (0.200) (0.259) 
Parent Characteristics    
Female 0.914 0.911 0.921 
 (0.280) (0.285) (0.270) 
Race    
    White 0.290 0.269 0.336* 
 (0.454) (0.444) (0.473) 
    Black 0.175 0.175 0.173 
 (0.380) (0.380) (0.379) 
    Asian 0.069 0.066 0.075 
 (0.254) (0.249) (0.265) 
    Other 0.052 0.046 0.066 
 (0.223) (0.210) (0.249) 
    Hispanic 0.414 0.444 0.349** 
 (0.493) (0.497) (0.477) 
Education    
    Less than high school 0.127 0.158 0.060*** 
 (0.333) (0.365) (0.237) 
    High school or GED 0.169 0.200 0.101*** 
 (0.375) (0.400) (0.301) 
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    Some college or associate degree 0.257 0.239 0.299*** 
 (0.437) (0.426) (0.458) 
    Bachelor degree or higher 0.447 0.404 0.541*** 
 (0.497) (0.491) (0.499) 
Child Characteristics    
Female 0.493 0.501 0.475 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
Age 1.790 1.762 1.851 
 (0.783) (0.781) (0.784) 
Household Characteristics    
Number of adults 2.037 2.056 1.997 
 (0.778) (0.813) (0.695) 
Borough    
    Bronx 0.219 0.224 0.208 
 (0.414) (0.417) (0.406) 
    Brooklyn 0.265 0.260 0.277 
 (0.442) (0.439) (0.448) 
    Manhattan 0.219 0.201 0.258* 
 (0.414) (0.401) (0.438) 
    Queens 0.218 0.233 0.186 
 (0.413) (0.423) (0.389) 
    Staten Island 0.079 0.082 0.072 
 (0.270) (0.274) (0.259) 
Poverty    
    > 50% 0.077 0.079 0.072 
 (0.267) (0.270) (0.259) 
    50-100% 0.176 0.193 0.138 
 (0.381) (0.395) (0.346) 
    101-200% 0.330 0.342 0.305 
 (0.471) (0.475) (0.461) 
    > 200% 0.417 0.386 0.484 
 (0.493) (0.487) (0.501) 
Childcare Characteristics    
Weekly cost 240.13 236.88 244.48 
 (230.12) (230.95) (229.60) 
Care type    
    Center-based 0.338 0.373 0.285* 
 (0.473) (0.484) (0.452) 
    Family daycare 0.193 0.179 0.213 
 (0.395) (0.384) (0.411) 
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    Paid in own home 0.164 0.154 0.180 
 (0.371) (0.362) (0.385) 
    Relative 0.305 0.294 0.322 
 (0.461) (0.456) (0.468) 
    
Observations 1,124 727 397 
 
Source: Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, 2017-2018 
Notes: Estimates represent weighted means or percentages. Number of observations is 
unweighted. Standard deviations in parentheses. Asterisks represent significant differences 
between no childcare change and any childcare change. 




Table 1—2. Household change characteristics by poverty status 
 
  






> 200% of 
Poverty 
Childcare changes (#) 0.499 0.360 0.363 0.353 
 (0.661) (0.632) (0.616) (0.748) 
Childcare changes (% of sample) 0.410 0.286 0.292 0.238 
 (0.493) (0.453) (0.455) (0.429) 
Job loss (% of sample) 0.111 0.137 0.084 0.088 
 (0.317) (0.345) (0.278) (0.283) 
Job start (% of sample) 0.155 0.201 0.274 0.248 
 (0.364) (0.402) (0.447) (0.433) 
Positive move (% of sample) 0.016 0.013 0.043 0.066 
 (0.126) (0.113) (0.203) (0.248) 
Negative move (% of sample) 0.036 0.115 0.056 0.084 
 (0.187) (0.320) (0.230) (0.277) 
Someone moved out (% of sample) 0.066 0.068 0.051 0.057 
 (0.250) (0.253) (0.220) (0.233) 
        
Observations 89 206 371 458 
 
 
Source: Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, 2017-2018 
Notes: Estimates represent weighted means or percentages. Number of observations is 




Table 1—3. Cox proportional hazards models of likelihood of childcare change within 9 months 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Household Changes     
Job loss 0.679*** 1.971*** 0.416** 1.515** 
 (0.172) (0.338) (0.134) (0.155) 
Job start 0.495*** 1.641*** 0.547** 1.728** 
 (0.134) (0.220) (0.169) (0.293) 
Positive move 0.163 1.177 0.469 1.599 
 (0.253) (0.298) (0.318) (0.509) 
Negative move 0.700*** 2.014*** 0.543* 1.722* 
 (0.199) (0.401) (0.250) (0.431) 
Someone moved out 0.568* 1.765* 0.399* 1.490* 
 (0.221) (0.390) (0.199) (0.245) 
Parent Characteristics    
Female 0.306 1.358 0.097 1.102 
 (0.230) (0.312) (0.264) (0.291) 
Race (ref=white)     
    Black -0.108 0.897 -0.303 0.739 
 (0.194) (0.174) (0.256) (0.189) 
    Asian -0.116 0.890 0.240 1.271 
 (0.233) (0.208) (0.256) (0.325) 
    Other 0.095 1.100 -0.066 0.936 
 (0.231) (0.254) (0.328) (0.307) 
    Hispanic 0.084 1.087 0.169 1.184 
 (0.158) (0.172) (0.203) (0.240) 
Education (ref=bachelor degree)    
    Less than high school 0.138*** 1.320*** 0.545 1.580 
 (0.251) (0.080) (0.349) (0.202) 
    High school or GED 0.037*** 1.354*** 0.738* 1.478* 
 (0.221) (0.078) (0.303) (0.145) 
    Some college or associate degree -0.195 0.823 -0.022 0.978 
 (0.158) (0.130) (0.205) (0.201) 
Child Characteristics     
Female -0.114 0.893 -0.229 0.795 
 (0.114) (0.102) (0.141) (0.112) 
Age 0.179* 1.196* 0.119 1.126 
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 (0.073) (0.087) (0.093) (0.104) 
Household Characteristics    
Number of adults -0.042 0.958 0.058 1.059 
 (0.083) (0.079) (0.104) (0.110) 
Borough (ref=Manhattan)    
    Bronx -0.300 0.741 -0.099 0.906 
 (0.183) (0.135) (0.241) (0.219) 
    Brooklyn -0.106 0.900 0.050 1.051 
 (0.158) (0.142) (0.190) (0.200) 
    Queens -0.284 0.753 -0.065 0.937 
 (0.172) (0.130) (0.215) (0.201) 
    Staten Island -0.244 0.783 0.028 1.028 
 (0.233) (0.182) (0.319) (0.328) 
Poverty (ref=>200%)     
    > 50% 0.036 1.037 0.128 1.137 
 (0.246) (0.255) (0.307) (0.349) 
    50-100% -0.217 0.805 -0.158 0.854 
 (0.176) (0.141) (0.260) (0.222) 
    101-200% -0.110 0.896 0.094 1.099 
 (0.137) (0.123) (0.167) (0.183) 
Childcare Characteristics    
Weekly cost   0.000*** 1.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Care type (ref=center-based)    
    Family daycare   0.187 1.206 
   (0.190) (0.229) 
    Paid in own home   0.273 1.314 
   (0.199) (0.262) 
    Relative   0.275 1.316 
   (0.184) (0.242) 
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 
 
Source: Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, 2017-2018 
Notes: P(Model) = 0.0000. Standard errors clustered at individual level. 




Table 1—4. Schoenfeld residual estimates for Cox proportional hazards models 
 






  Correlation p-value Correlation p-value 
Household Changes    
Job loss -0.098 0.058+ -0.122 0.035* 
Job start -0.119 0.020* -0.099 0.071+ 
Positive move 0.141 0.019* 0.144 0.027* 
Negative move -0.121 0.021* -0.104 0.086+ 
Someone moved out 0.169 0.001** 0.176 0.001** 
Parent Characteristics    
Female -0.030 0.475 0.010 0.846 
Race (ref=white)    
    Black 0.036 0.393 0.055 0.240 
    Asian -0.013 0.773 -0.076 0.254 
    Other -0.017 0.737 -0.040 0.543 
    Hispanic 0.025 0.580 0.008 0.879 
Education (ref=bachelor degree)   
    Less than high school 0.077 0.114 -0.008 0.888 
    High school or GED 0.030 0.497 0.049 0.340 
    Some college or associate 
degree -0.009 0.824 -0.035 0.456 
Child Characteristics    
Female 0.016 0.710 -0.057 0.288 
Age 0.014 0.749 -0.027 0.623 
Household Characteristics   
Number of adults -0.005 0.915 0.055 0.223 
Borough (ref=Manhattan)    
    Bronx -0.044 0.316 -0.044 0.372 
    Brooklyn -0.038 0.417 -0.050 0.391 
    Queens 0.001 0.989 -0.061 0.263 
    Staten Island 0.002 0.967 0.020 0.690 
Poverty (ref=>200%)     
    < 50% -0.053 0.900 -0.049 0.359 
    50-100% -0.019 0.700 0.027 0.624 
    101-200% -0.040 0.349 -0.081 0.154 
Childcare Characteristics   
Weekly cost   -0.010 0.900 
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Care type (ref=center-based)   
    Family daycare  -0.067 0.252 
    Paid in own home  -0.090 0.120 
    Relative   -0.019 0.723 
     
Global test   0.341   0.282 
 
Source: Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, 2017-2018 




Table 1—5. Cox proportional hazards models of likelihood of childcare change within 9 months, 
including time-varying covariates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Household Changes    
Job loss 0.450*** 1.585*** 0.396** 1.486** 
 (0.135) (0.159) (0.106) (0.644) 
Job start 0.593 1.809 0.617 1.937 
 (0.685) (1.238) (0.799) (4.027) 
Positive move 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative move 0.528** 1.696** 0.673*** 1.961*** 
 (0.164) (0.278) (0.164) (0.321) 
Someone moved out -5.289* 0.005* -5.791* 0.003* 
 (2.212) (0.011) (2.787) (0.009) 
Time-Varying Household Changes   
Job loss*time since last wave -0.096 0.908 0.023 1.023 
 (0.311) (0.282) (0.423) (0.433) 
Job start*time since last wave -0.054 0.947 -0.444 0.642 
 (0.260) (0.247) (0.316) (0.203) 
Positive move*time since last  0.095 1.100 0.176 1.193 
    wave (0.090) (0.099) (0.117) (0.140) 
Negative move*time since last  -0.888 0.411 -0.779 0.459 
    wave (0.771) (0.453) (0.510) (0.234) 
Someone moved out*time since  0.734*** 2.169*** 0.791*** 2.206*** 
    last wave (0.291) (0.922) (0.227) (0.342) 
Parent Characteristics    
Female 0.290 1.336 0.050 1.052 
 (0.233) (0.312) (0.267) (0.281) 
Race (ref=white)     
    Black -0.096 0.908 -0.310 0.733 
 (0.193) (0.175) (0.257) (0.188) 
    Asian -0.151 0.860 0.140 1.151 
 (0.235) (0.202) (0.271) (0.311) 
    Other 0.085 1.088 -0.078 0.925 
 (0.234) (0.254) (0.327) (0.302) 
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    Hispanic 0.078 1.081 0.147 1.158 
 (0.159) (0.172) (0.200) (0.231) 
Education (ref=bachelor degree)    
    Less than high school 0.173*** 1.309*** 0.576 1.562 
 (0.257) (0.080) (0.355) (0.199) 
    High school or GED 0.063*** 1.345*** 0.760* 1.468* 
 (0.222) (0.077) (0.305) (0.143) 
    Some college or associate degree -0.188 0.829 -0.001 0.999 
 (0.158) (0.131) (0.204) (0.204) 
Child Characteristics    
Female -0.119 0.888 -0.253 0.776 
 (0.116) (0.103) (0.142) (0.110) 
Age 0.178* 1.195* 0.126 1.134 
 (0.074) (0.088) (0.094) (0.106) 
Household Characteristics    
Number of adults -0.050 0.952 0.069 1.072 
 (0.082) (0.078) (0.103) (0.110) 
Borough (ref=Manhattan)    
    Bronx -0.291 0.748 -0.118 0.888 
 (0.183) (0.137) (0.238) (0.211) 
    Brooklyn -0.110 0.895 -0.006 0.994 
 (0.160) (0.143) (0.193) (0.192) 
    Queens -0.275 0.759 -0.073 0.930 
 (0.172) (0.131) (0.213) (0.198) 
    Staten Island -0.245 0.783 -0.037 0.963 
 (0.231) (0.181) (0.314) (0.302) 
Poverty (ref=>200%)     
    > 50% 0.019 1.019 0.102 1.108 
 (0.248) (0.253) (0.302) (0.335) 
    50-100% -0.192 0.825 -0.145 0.865 
 (0.175) (0.145) (0.260) (0.225) 
    101-200% -0.106 0.900 0.087 1.090 
 (0.137) (0.124) (0.165) (0.180) 
Childcare Characteristics    
Weekly cost   0.000*** 1.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Care type (ref=center-based)  0.205 1.227 
    Family daycare   (0.190) (0.234) 
   0.272 1.312 
    Paid in own home   (0.199) (0.261) 
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   0.291 1.338 
    Relative   (0.188) (0.252) 
     
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 
 
Source: Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, 2017-2018 
Notes: P(Model) = 0.0000. Standard errors clustered at individual level. 





Table 1—A1. Cox proportional hazards models of likelihood of childcare change within 9 
months, Breslow method to break ties 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Household Changes     
Job loss 0.584*** 1.793*** 0.347 1.416 
 (0.141) (0.253) (0.188) (0.266) 
Job start 0.433*** 1.542*** 0.460*** 1.585*** 
 (0.116) (0.179) (0.139) (0.221) 
Positive move 0.096 1.101 0.361 1.434 
 (0.209) (0.230) (0.252) (0.361) 
Negative move 0.598*** 1.819*** 0.448* 1.565* 
 (0.164) (0.299) (0.204) (0.319) 
Someone moved out 0.188 1.207 0.050 1.052 
 (0.224) (0.270) (0.302) (0.317) 
Parent Characteristics    
Female 0.257 1.293 0.060 1.062 
 (0.207) (0.267) (0.225) (0.239) 
Race (ref=white)     
    Black -0.093 0.911 -0.267 0.766 
 (0.172) (0.157) (0.221) (0.169) 
    Asian -0.092 0.912 0.206 1.229 
 (0.209) (0.190) (0.218) (0.268) 
    Other 0.053 1.054 -0.065 0.937 
 (0.204) (0.215) (0.285) (0.268) 
    Hispanic 0.063 1.065 0.131 1.140 
 (0.138) (0.147) (0.170) (0.194) 
Education (ref=bachelor degree)    
    Less than high school 0.041*** 1.353*** -0.460 0.631 
 (0.235) (0.083) (0.309) (0.195) 
    High school or GED 0.945*** 1.389*** 0.645* 1.525* 
 (0.205) (0.080) (0.274) (0.144) 
    Some college or associate 
degree -0.173 0.841 -0.021 0.979 
 (0.139) (0.117) (0.173) (0.169) 
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Child Characteristics     
Female -0.094 0.910 -0.178 0.837 
 (0.102) (0.092) (0.122) (0.102) 
Age 0.163* 1.177* 0.103 1.109 
 (0.065) (0.076) (0.079) (0.088) 
Household Characteristics    
Number of adults -0.041 0.960 0.049 1.050 
 (0.075) (0.072) (0.089) (0.094) 
Borough (ref=Manhattan)    
    Bronx -0.253 0.776 -0.066 0.936 
 (0.163) (0.127) (0.208) (0.195) 
    Brooklyn -0.086 0.918 0.043 1.044 
 (0.140) (0.128) (0.164) (0.171) 
    Queens -0.247 0.781 -0.056 0.946 
 (0.153) (0.120) (0.187) (0.177) 
    Staten Island -0.212 0.809 0.023 1.024 
 (0.208) (0.168) (0.270) (0.276) 
Poverty (ref=>200%)     
    > 50% 0.054 1.056 0.128 1.136 
 (0.221) (0.233) (0.269) (0.306) 
    50-100% -0.180 0.835 -0.120 0.887 
 (0.159) (0.133) (0.230) (0.204) 
    101-200% -0.079 0.924 0.090 1.094 
 (0.122) (0.113) (0.145) (0.159) 
Childcare Characteristics    
Weekly cost   0.000*** 1.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Care type (ref=center-based)   0.154 
    Family daycare   (0.167) (0.194) 
   0.235 1.265 
    Paid in own home   (0.173) (0.219) 
   0.221 1.247 
    Relative   (0.159) (0.198) 
     
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 
 
Source: Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, 2017-2018 
Notes: P(Model) = 0.0000. Standard errors clustered at individual level. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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Table 1—A2. Cox proportional hazards models of likelihood of childcare change within 9 
months, including time-varying covariates, Breslow method to break ties 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Household Changes    
Job loss 0.931*** 2.538*** 0.352** 1.422** 
 (0.296) (0.767) (0.112) (0.297) 
Job start 0.577 1.780 1.320* 3.742* 
 (0.597) (1.062) (0.665) (2.489) 
Positive move 0.052 1.053 -0.075 0.928 
 (0.207) (0.218) (0.283) (0.263) 
Negative move 0.535** 1.615** 0.669*** 1.989*** 
 (0.194) (0.217) (0.041) (0.788) 
Someone moved out -4.386* 0.012* -4.898* 0.007* 
 (1.932) (0.024) (2.466) (0.018) 
Time-Varying Household Changes   
Job loss*3 months -0.131 0.877 0.013 1.013 
 (0.258) (0.227) (0.347) (0.351) 
Job start*3 months -0.070 0.933 -0.355 0.701 
 (0.226) (0.210) (0.263) (0.185) 
Positive move*3 months 0.080 1.083 0.146 1.158 
 (0.074) (0.080) (0.091) (0.106) 
Negative move*3 months -0.755 0.470 -0.612 0.542 
 (0.614) (0.448) (0.414) (0.224) 
Someone moved out*3 months 0.682*** 2.378*** 0.856*** 2.396*** 
 (0.271) (0.609) (0.263) (0.520) 
Parent Characteristics    
Female 0.242 1.274 0.016 1.016 
 (0.208) (0.266) (0.226) (0.230) 
Race (ref=white)     
    Black -0.080 0.923 -0.270 0.764 
 (0.171) (0.158) (0.220) (0.168) 
    Asian -0.108 0.897 0.145 1.156 
 (0.208) (0.187) (0.227) (0.262) 
    Other 0.052 1.053 -0.075 0.928 
 (0.207) (0.218) (0.283) (0.263) 
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    Hispanic 0.062 1.064 0.114 1.121 
 (0.139) (0.148) (0.169) (0.189) 
Education (ref=bachelor degree)    
    Less than high school 0.064*** 1.345*** 0.486 1.615 
 (0.239) (0.082) (0.312) (0.192) 
    High school or GED 0.963*** 1.382*** 0.657* 1.519* 
 (0.205) (0.078) (0.274) (0.142) 
    Some college or associate 
degree -0.167 0.846 -0.006 0.994 
 (0.138) (0.117) (0.172) (0.171) 
Child Characteristics    
Female -0.093 0.911 -0.192 0.826 
 (0.102) (0.093) (0.122) (0.101) 
Age 0.161* 1.175* 0.108 1.114 
 (0.065) (0.077) (0.080) (0.089) 
Household Characteristics    
Number of adults -0.048 0.953 0.055 1.056 
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.087) (0.092) 
Borough (ref=Manhattan)    
    Bronx -0.249 0.780 -0.082 0.921 
 (0.162) (0.127) (0.204) (0.188) 
    Brooklyn -0.084 0.919 0.008 1.008 
 (0.141) (0.129) (0.166) (0.167) 
    Queens -0.246 0.782 -0.067 0.936 
 (0.152) (0.119) (0.185) (0.173) 
    Staten Island -0.211 0.809 -0.029 0.972 
 (0.205) (0.166) (0.266) (0.259) 
Poverty (ref=>200%)     
    > 50% 0.044 1.045 0.107 1.113 
 (0.222) (0.232) (0.265) (0.295) 
    50-100% -0.160 0.852 -0.102 0.903 
 (0.159) (0.136) (0.229) (0.207) 
    101-200% -0.074 0.929 0.083 1.087 
 (0.122) (0.113) (0.142) (0.155) 
Childcare Characteristics    
Weekly cost   0.000*** 1.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Care type (ref=center-based)   0.177 
    Family daycare   (0.167) (0.199) 
   0.234 1.264 
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    Paid in own home   (0.172) (0.218) 
   0.240 1.272 
    Relative   (0.162) (0.205) 
     
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 
 
Source: Early Childhood Poverty Tracker, 2017-2018 
Notes: P(Model) = 0.0000. Standard errors clustered at individual level. 








The recent implementation of universal pre-kindergarten in New York City presents a 
promising opportunity to benefit families and lessen economic inequality among city residents. 
While research indicates that NYC’s UPK benefits child health and evidence from abroad shows 
that universal care improves test scores for some children and increases adult earnings among 
children who were enrolled in care, it is not evident that UPK has a positive effect on parents. 
Using data from the American Community Survey, I estimate difference-in-difference and triple-
difference models to compare education and employment outcomes of parents with children 
eligible for NYC UPK to other groups of similar parents. I find no effect on parents’ enrollment 
in schooling or in labor force engagement, although I do find a sizeable increase in reported 
earnings in the previous year. Subgroup analysis reveals that this increase in earnings is 
attributable to increases by families not in poverty and by married or cohabiting parents. These 
results suggest that while NYC’s UPK program may improve earnings for traditionally more 
advantaged parents, the program does not improve outcomes for parents in poverty and single 
parents. Forthcoming and suggested program improvements may contribute to future success in 
the program’s stated goal of leveling the playing field among New Yorkers. 
 
Introduction 
While America’s public education system ensures that children aged five years and older 
can enroll in free schooling, parents with children under age five typically have been forced to 
seek out private solutions for care (Gornick and Meyers, 2003). Many low-income parents are 
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able to secure care for young children through subsidies, such as those provided by the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program or the Child Care and Development Fund, or 
through programs such as Head Start; yet many families who would benefit from free or 
subsidized care arrangements either do not qualify for such programs or do not receive benefits 
(Herbst, 2008). As such, universal childcare programs present a promising opportunity to support 
all families, allowing parents to engage in work or in education and supporting child 
development through high-quality programming.  
International evidence indicates that universal care can benefit children and families 
(Baker et al., 2008; Bauernschuster and Schlotter, 2015; Havnes and Mogstad, 2015; 
Kottelenberg and Lehrer, 2017; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008). However, with only a handful of 
universal childcare programs in the United States, there is limited and conflicting evidence from 
the American context on the impact of universal care on parents. Further, there is an ongoing 
debate concerning the benefits of universal care as compared to targeted care (Kottelenberg and 
Lehrer, 2017). Universal childcare programs are particularly likely to have varying effects for 
different types of families, as they typically enroll a wider swath of families. Thus, though most 
prior studies focus on average effects, it is important to understand heterogeneity in outcomes 
among participants in universal childcare programs. 
 In 2014, New York City (NYC) introduced a universal pre-kindergarten (UPK) program, 
known as “Pre-K for All.” The program is designed to be easily accessible and is free to all 
eligible families. Children are eligible to participate in UPK if they satisfy two requirements: 
first, they must live in NYC; second, they must turn four years old by December 31 of the 
academic year in which they enroll. With a partial roll-out in 2014 and a full roll-out in 2015, 
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UPK achieved nearly universal take-up within the first two years of implementation (Hong et al., 
2017).  
This study examines the effects of NYC’s UPK on important parental outcomes: 
education, work, and earnings. I use the American Community Survey (ACS), which is unique in 
its ability to geolocate families within large cities and provide samples large enough to conduct 
appropriately-powered statistical inference at the NYC level, including subgroup analysis to 
examine heterogeneity in outcomes. I conduct analysis with difference-in-difference (DD) and 
triple-difference (DDD) methods, comparing eligible families in NYC both before and after the 
enactment of the UPK policy to similar families in other large cities. I find no effect on parental 
enrollment in schooling or in labor force engagement, although I do find a sizeable increase in 
reported earnings (approximately $6,000) earned in the previous year. Subgroup analysis reveals 
that this increase in earnings is attributable to increases by families not in poverty and married or 
cohabiting parents. My results therefore suggest that while NYC’s UPK program may improve 
earnings for traditionally more advantaged parents, the program does not improve education or 
employment outcomes for parents in poverty and single parents. Forthcoming and suggested 
program improvements may contribute to future success in the program’s stated goal of leveling 
the playing field among New Yorkers. 
  
Background 
Universal Pre-Kindergarten in New York City 
Although New York City has had a UPK program since 1998, as part of a New York 
state program, the program historically was underfunded and the majority of eligible children 
were not enrolled. In his 2013 campaign, now-Mayor Bill de Blasio made UPK a cornerstone of 
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his platform, pledging to end, in his words, “the tale of two cities” (Goldstein, 2016). He vowed 
to bring economic parity to city residents by creating a truly universally accessible and high-
quality preschool program (Potter, 2015).  
When de Blasio took office in 2014, approximately 18 percent of eligible children were 
enrolled in full-day UPK programs and approximately 37 percent were enrolled in half-day 
programs. As half-day programs are less beneficial both to children and to parents, a key promise 
of the de Blasio administration was to make more full-day seats available. This was 
accomplished by converting half-day seats and by adding new full-day seats. Pre-K for All was 
introduced in the 2014-2015 school year. The initial year of the program was a partial 
implementation; the subsequent 2015-2016 school year fully implemented the program and made 
full-day UPK available to all age-eligible children in NYC (Potter, 2015). The program has a 
broad reach, with estimates indicating a nearly universal enrollment of eligible children by the 
2015-2016 school year (Hong et al., 2017). 
Eligibility for UPK is based on NYC residence and child age. Children must turn four 
years old prior to December 31 of the academic year in which they enroll. While all eligible 
children are guaranteed enrollment, they are not guaranteed enrollment at their first choice 
location; in 2015, 7 in 10 children were placed at their first choice location, and 8 in 10 children 
were placed at one of their top three choices (Hong et al., 2017). 
As NYC’s UPK program is relatively new, there is limited evidence on its effects on 
children and families. Hong and colleagues (2017) find that the program led to child health 
benefits. To my knowledge, there is no existing evidence on the effect of NYC’s UPK program 
on parental outcomes such as employment and education. 
Universal Care and Parental Employment 
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Evidence from the United States on the effects of universal childcare is scarce, as few 
such programs exist.2 Fitzpatrick (2009) finds evidence that, while UPK in Georgia and 
Oklahoma increased enrollment in preschool (particularly among children of women with less 
than a college degree), it did not have a substantial effect on maternal employment. Among 
women living in rural Georgia, however, employment increased 20 percent after the enactment 
of UPK. In addition, a recent evaluation of UPK in Washington, DC found that universal care 
increased maternal labor force participation by 10 percentage points (Malik, 2018). While these 
studies are informative, they may not be applicable to the New York City context due to 
difference in UPK programs. During the study period, Georgia and Oklahoma had only half-day 
programs, which may make it challenging for parents to engage in employment. Further, the 
UPK program in Washington, DC is a two-year program, which extends both to three- and four-
year old children. While NYC currently is rolling out UPK for three-year-old children, the period 
I study does not include care for younger children in New York. 
While much evidence from abroad examines the effect of universal childcare on child 
outcomes, there is also some research on parent outcomes, which indicates that universal care 
can increase the hours and weeks worked by parents. In Canada, the universal childcare program 
in Quebec resulted in an employment increase among mothers of approximately 6 to 8 
percentage points (Baker et al., 2008; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008). A study of a German 
reform in 1996 that enacted half-day universal childcare shows that a having child attending care 
increases probability of maternal employment by 36.6 percentage points (Bauernschuster and 
Schlotter, 2015).  
 
2 See Herbst (2017) for research on America’s universal childcare provision during World War 
II. 
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It should be noted that the bulk of this literature does not examine heterogeneity in 
outcomes, instead focusing on averages. While informative, it is possible that parents in different 
situations—such as those in poverty or who are single—respond differently to universal care. It 
is evident from existing research on universal care and child outcomes that heterogeneous 
treatment effects are likely. Effects of universal care on child outcomes tend to be positive for 
low-income households, but zero or negative otherwise. A study of the 1997 Quebec Family 
Policy, which is the only scaled-up universal childcare policy in North America, indicates that 
universal care improves test scores for children from single-parent families, especially at the 
lower end of the income distribution (Kottelenberg and Lehrer, 2017). For children from two-
parent families in the middle of the income distribution, however, impacts are negative, and 
children in the top half of the distribution not impacted. Evidence from Norway also suggests 
that children from low-income households benefit the most from universal childcare. For every 
dollar spend on Norwegian universal care, children who participated in universal care had 
increased earning once they became working adults, with an average of $311 per child (Havnes 
and Mogstad, 2015). When examining these results across the income distribution, the impact of 
universal care on adult earnings is positive or zero until 82nd percentile, at which point the effect 
is negative. Higher-income children lose $1.15 in earnings on average as adults for every dollar 
spent on childcare; low-income children gain $1.31 on average. Given this stark heterogeneity in 
outcomes, authors of both studies suggest that childcare targeted to more under-resourced 
households is a more beneficial use of public funds than universal care. 
Childcare and Parental Education 
Though prior work extensively examines the effects of childcare—both universal and 
targeted— on parent labor market outcomes, we know relatively little about whether childcare 
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impacts parental education. Student parents face unique challenges in reconciling work-family 
conflicts, particularly in terms of constrained finances and time. While many students take out 
substantial loans to pay for their educations, student parents face the additional financial pressure 
of supporting a family and thus tend to borrow greater amounts of money (Kreighbaum, 2018). 
To meet these financial demands, many student parents juggle coursework, family 
responsibilities, and employment (Kreighbaum, 2018), thus compounding the work-life tension 
that exists for many low-income parents by adding coursework to an already-challenging mix of 
demands. Yet, while many student parents may work, they may not be able to work enough 
hours per week to meet the minimum number of hours required to receive childcare benefits 
through welfare programs (Goldrick-Rab, 2018). Thus, the introduction of UPK provides an 
avenue to explore the effect of free childcare on parent educational outcomes. 
Despite the challenges student parents face, they also may be uniquely well-suited to 
benefit from childcare programs such as UPK. Theory indicates that parental education may be 
better aligned with many childcare arrangements than employment is, as classroom hours often 
are quite similar to the standard hours in which most childcare arrangements are open (Sabol and 
Chase-Lansdale, 2015; Sommer et al., 2018); this would be particularly true for UPK, which 
only offers care during school hours and during the school year. As many of the obstacles to 
degree completion for low-income students are logistical, solving the problem of childcare 
logistics for student parents could have substantial positive impacts on parent educational 
attainment (Sommer et al., 2018). However, as UPK provides only one year of care, and 
educational programs typically require more than one year to complete, its effect on education 
may be limited. 
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Data, Sample, and Measures 
To examine the effect of the introduction of UPK on parent educational outcomes in New 
York City, I use the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS). The ACS is a national survey conducted on a rolling basis throughout the year. The 1-
year PUMS files representing a sample of approximately 1 percent of the U.S. population living 
in areas with populations greater than 65,000; it is therefore well-suited for this analysis both due 
to the large sample size and to sampling from major cities. I pool data from 2005 to 2017 into a 
single dataset, using data from 2005 to 2014 to evaluate the assumptions necessary for the 
chosen statistical methods, described below. I use data through 2017 both because it is the most 
recently-available data and because stopping analysis at this year ensures that my study period 
ends before the introduction of NYC’s universal preschool program for three-year-old children. 
While I cannot observe whether a child participated in UPK, prior research shows that 
take-up of the program is nearly universal (Hong et al., 2017). I identify the treated group as 
parents living in NYC after 2014 whose youngest child is four years old. This identification is 
likely to capture most, though not all, UPK-eligible families. Although ACS interviews 
households throughout the year, information regarding when the household was interviewed is 
not available. A family with a four-year-old child at the time of interview would be eligible for 
UPK in the same calendar year; however, they may not be eligible at the time of interview. For 
example, a family interviewed March whose child turned four years old February would not be 
eligible to enroll in UPK until September; in contrast, a family interviewed in March whose child 
turned four years old in December of the previous year would be UPK-eligible at the time of the 
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interview.3 Additionally, I cannot identify children who are three years at the time of the 
interview but turn four by the end of the calendar year. Including all three-year-old children is 
likely to cause more bias than omitting the fraction of children who are three at the time of the 
interview but four by the end of the calendar year. Thus, this analysis likely underestimates the 
true effect of UPK on parent outcomes, as I am unable to capture precise UPK eligibility; I may 
capture some parents who will be but are not yet eligible, and I may fail to capture some parents 
who are currently eligible. 
I create three analytical samples that include this treatment group. Each sample includes 
observations from the pre-UPK period (2005-2014) and the post-UPK period (2015-2017). The 
first sample compares treated parents to parents whose youngest child is four-years-old living in 
the 50 largest cities by population, excluding cities with large public preschool programs during 
the study period4 (Allison Friedman-Krauss et al., 2019; Malik, 2018). Table 1 details both the 
included and excluded cities. I identify both parents living in NYC and in these other cities using 
both the state and Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) codes included in the ACS. The second 
sample compares treated parents to parents in NYC whose youngest child is under the age of 
four years. I identify these parents using state and PUMA codes to indicate NYC residence, and 
child age to indicate eligibility for UPK. Finally, the third sample compares treated parents to 
parents with younger children living in NYC, relative to corresponding parents of same-age 
children in other large cities. The third sample is identified using a combination of variables used 
to identify the first two samples. 
 
3 While I intended to use the quarter of birth variable to address this issue, I was advised by ACS 
analysts that this variable—particularly in the public-use version—is greatly unreliable. 
4 I also exclude New Orleans, as Hurricane Katrina had notable impacts on the city during this 
time period. 
 50 
Outcome variables pertain both to parent education and employment. I examine parent 
education through a binary variable indicating whether the parent was enrolled in school at the 
time of the survey.5 I also construct two variables to measure parental employment outcomes. 
First, I use a binary indicator variable to measure whether the respondent worked in the week 
prior to completing the survey. Second, I apply inflation factors to a measure of continuous 
earnings in the past 12 months to convert earnings to 2017 dollars. 
 I also control for a variety of demographic characteristics in all models. Parental 
characteristics include sex (binary, where 1=female), race (binary for mutually exclusive 
categories of white, black, Asian, and other), Hispanic ethnicity (binary, where 1=Hispanic), 
marital status (categorical for married, cohabiting, and single), age (continuous), and age-
squared. Household characteristics include the age of the youngest child (continuous), the 
number of children in the household (continuous), and the household size (continuous). 
 
Methods 
A key consideration when studying a policy such as UPK is potential endogeneity. If 
parents who enroll their children in UPK are those who have the most to gain by doing so (such 
as guaranteed access to educational or employment opportunities), this would cause bias in the 
estimates. Thus, I use the rollout of UPK to address this endogeneity. I estimate difference-in-
 
5 In preliminary analysis, I also constructed several other variables to examine parent education: 
a continuous variable indicating the level of education the respondent is currently enrolled in 
(i.e., the number of total years of education); a categorical variable indicating whether the 
respondent is currently enrolled in high school, college, or graduate school; and finally, a 
categorical variable indicating whether the respondent has obtained a high school diploma, a 
GED, an associate’s degree, a bachelor’s degree, or a graduate degree. These variables were not 
used in the final analysis due to different pre-treatment trends and the small sample size of 
parents who responded to these questions. 
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difference (DD) and triple-difference (DDD) models, which allow me to construct a control 
group of similar families who do not have access to UPK and compare outcomes between the 
groups. 
The DD models compare changes in the outcomes in NYC, before and after the 
implementation of UPK, to corresponding changes over time in control groups. First, I explore 
the difference between parents with four-year-old children in NYC to parents with four-year-old 
children in other large cities, before and after the implementation of UPK, using the equation 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑁𝑌𝐶)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       (1), 
where Y is the outcome variable (parental enrollment in education, whether the individual 
worked in the previous week, or earnings in the past 12 months), for individual i living in city j 
in year t. POST is a dummy variable set to 1 (0) for after (before) the implementation of UPK, 
and NYC is an indicator variable set to 1 (0) for individuals living in NYC (other large cities). 
For models estimating earnings in the past 12 months, this treatment variable is lagged to 
account for the timing of the outcome. The term 𝛽1 indicates the DD estimator. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of 
parent-level control variables, 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of household-level control variables, and 𝑇𝑡and 𝐶𝑗 
are vectors of year and city fixed effects. While a traditional DD model would include both a 
POST and NYC binary variable, the inclusion of the year and city fixed effects makes this 
unnecessary. 
Second, I explore the difference between parents in NYC with a youngest child aged four 
years to parents in NYC with a youngest child under the age of four years, before and after the 
implementation of UPK, using the equation 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       (2), 
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where POST is a dummy variable set to 1 (0) for after (before) the implementation of UPK, and 
FOUR is an indicator variable set to 1 (0) for parents whose youngest child is (is not) four years 
old. The term 𝛽1 indicates the DD estimator. 
 Finally, I estimate a DDD model. This model compares parents with four-year-old 
children to parents with younger children living in NYC, relative to corresponding parents of 
same-age children in other large cities, before and after the implementation of UPK, using the 
equation, 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑁𝑌𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑁𝑌𝐶)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅)𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽4(𝑁𝑌𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       (3), 
where term 𝛽1 indicates the DDD estimator. 
All equations are estimated using linear probability models for ease of interpretation. 
For these models to generate causal estimates of the effect of UPK on parental education 
and employment outcomes, the changes over time in outcomes of parents in the treatment group 
should be similar to changes over time in outcomes of parents in the various control groups. 
Dissimilar pre-treatment trends violate the DD requirements: for example, if educational 
enrollment increased faster for parents in other large cities than in NYC prior to the enactment of 
UPK, estimated causal effects will be overestimated due to a spurious relation to parental 
education. Though I cannot know what the outcomes for parents in NYC been in the post-UPK 
enactment period in the absence of UPK, we can examine pre-UPK trends. Accordingly, I 
investigate whether pre-treatment trends in the outcome variables for NYC are similar to pre-
trends observed among the control groups. 
I estimate pre-treatment trends with the following model, using observations from before 
NYC’s UPK enactment in 2014, for NYC and the control groups: 
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𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (4). 
In Equation 4, TR is a linear time trend for the period ending in 2014 and 𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 (0) for untreated (treated) families. For the control group 
specified in Equation 1, 𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 is households in other large cities with a four-year-old; for 
the control group specified in Equation 2, 𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 is households in NYC whose youngest 
child is under four years old. The coefficient on the interaction term, 𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡, denotes 
whether the pre-trend for the outcome variable is different between NYC and the set of control 
cities or states. Ideally, the coefficient on this term would be neither significant nor large in 
magnitude, which would strongly suggest that these models meet the assumption of parallel 
trends. 
 I estimate Equation 4 for both DD models, which use differing control groups. As the 
DDD model estimates the difference between the two DD models, parallel trends within both 
DD models implies satisfied assumptions for the DDD model (Wing et al., 2018). 
 In addition to these primary DD and DDD models, I also examine whether the treatment 
effect differs for various subgroups using DDD models. First, I compare low-income parents to 
non-low-income parents. I define low-income as at or below 100 percent of ACS’s calculated 
income-to-poverty ratio, and non-low-income as above 100 percent. I next compare female to 
male parents and partnered (married or cohabiting) to single parents. 
 Finally, I test the sensitivity of these results to the year in which I specify as the 
beginning of the post-treatment period (specified in the above equations as POST). UPK was not 
initially full implemented within NYC; rather, in the fall of 2014, the program was phased in to a 
portion of districts within the city. UPK was fully implemented—i.e., available in every 
district—in fall 2015. As such, I specify the POST period as after 2015 in my main models, since 
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this represents full implementation. However, I estimate the same models using years after 2014 
as the post-treatment period as a sensitivity test. It is possible that these estimates will be biased 
downward, as I am unable to measure which families were eligible in the 2014 school year, and 




 It is necessary to satisfy the assumption of parallel pre-treatment trends in order to 
proceed with DD and DDD methods. An insignificant and near-zero pre-treatment trend 
indicates that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied. Table 1 shows the estimated pre-
treatment trends for the three outcomes, with Panel A showing the pre-treatment trends for 
partial implementation of UPK and Panel B showing the same trends for full implementation of 
UPK. Each Panel shows estimated pre-treatment trends for both DD models, where 
Trend*NoTreat in Columns 1-3 indicates the trend for parents with four-year-old children in 
other large cities (as compared to in NYC) and Trend*NoTreat in Columns 4-6 indicates the 
trend for parents with children younger than four years in NYC (as compared to parents of 
children four years old). 
 Across both panels and both DD models, estimates of pre-treatment trends are 
statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. As such, the assumption of parallel trends is 
satisfied for both DD models and for the DDD model, which estimates the difference between 
the two DD models. 
Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 3 presents characteristics of the treatment group and two DD control groups, both 
pre-UPK (2005-2015) and post-UPK (2016-2017). Across all groups, parental enrollment in 
schooling decreased while work engagement increased. Earnings in the prior year also increased 
for all groups, with the treatment group seeing the largest increase from before UPK ($40,511) to 
after UPK’s full implementation ($50,941). 
Turning to parent characteristics, I find that females constituted just over half of parents 
in the sample across all groups and periods. There were substantially more white parents and 
moderately more Hispanic parents in cities other than NYC, as compared to parents in NYC. 
Married parents made up the largest share of parents across all groups, with roughly three in four 
parents in a marriage. On average, the age of parents across all groups was late 30s or early 40s.  
Finally, when considering household characteristics, I find that the age of the youngest 
child in the control group consisting of parents with children under age four was 1.3 (in the 
treatment group and control group with parents in other large cities, all the youngest children 
were age four). While parents in the treatment group and the control group with parents in other 
large cities tended only to have approximately one child in the household, parents whose 
youngest child was under age four had an average of 1.4 children in the household. Finally, 
across all groups the average household size was between 4 and 5 people. 
Primary Models 
Primary DD and DDD results are shown in Table 4. Columns 1, 4, and 7 show the 
difference between parents with four-year-old children in NYC to parents with four-year-old 
children in other large cities, before and after the implementation of UPK. Columns 2, 5, and 8 
show the difference between parents in NYC with a youngest child aged four years to parents in 
NYC with a youngest child under the age of four years, before and after the implementation of 
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UPK. Columns 3, 6, and 9 show DDD estimates, which compare parents with four-year-old 
children to parents with younger children living in NYC, relative to corresponding parents of 
same-age children in other large cities, before and after the implementation of UPK. 
Table 4 shows no significant difference in parental enrollment in school across DD and 
DDD models (Columns 1-3). Notably, these models have a much lower R-squared value than 
that of the models in Columns 4-9, potentially indicating that the low rate of school enrollment 
among parents in the different samples hindered the analysis. Columns 4-6, which show the 
effect of UPK on parents reporting work engagement in the previous week, similarly are 
imprecise and small in magnitude. Finally, Columns 7-9 present the estimated treatment effects 
on parental earnings in the previous year. These results indicate a significant and large increase 
in earnings, both when comparing UPK-eligible parents to parents with younger children in NYC 
(an increase of $6,077) and when comparing UPK-eligible parents to parents with younger 
children living in NYC, relative to corresponding parents of same-age children in other large 
cities (an increase of $5,846). 
Subgroup Analysis 
 The primary analysis captures all parents in the sample with age-eligible children in 
NYC. While informative, this analysis may miss difference between different types of parents. 
As such, I conduct subgroup analysis with DDD models, shown in Table 5, to compare parents 
by poverty status, sex, and partnership. 
 Panel A compares results of households in poverty to those not in poverty, as defined by 
the income-to-poverty ratio. These estimates suggest that the primary results are driven by non-
poor households, as point estimates for households in poverty are negative (though insignificant) 
across all three outcomes. The increase in annual earnings seen in the primary results in Table 4 
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is attributable to an average $7,363 increase for households not in poverty; in contrast, point 
estimates suggest that poor households may have seen either a decrease or no change in annual 
earnings after the full implementation of UPK. 
 Panel B compares female to male parents. While none of these results are statistically 
significant, point estimates suggest that the increase in average earnings across the full sample is 
mainly attributable to male parents. 
 Finally, I compare single to partnered (married or cohabiting) parents in Panel C. I find a 
significant increase of nearly $7,500 in earnings in the past year for partnered parents and no 
change (or potentially a decrease in earnings, from the point estimate) in earnings in the past year 
for single parents. As with the subgroup analysis found in Panels A and B, these results indicate 
the increase in earnings found in the main analysis was largely due to increase in one group. 
Sensitivity Testing 
 While full implementation of UPK occurred in 2015, partial implementation occurred in 
2014. I use the 2015 full implementation date in my analysis, as I am unable to measure which 
parents had eligible children during partial implementation. However, I conduct a sensitivity 
analysis using the partial implementation in 2014 as the date of treatment. I would expect the 
point estimates from these results to be smaller than from the primary results, as fewer parents 
had children eligible for UPK in this sample. 
 Table 6 presents estimated results from this sensitivity test.  These results are largely 
consistent with the main results shown in Table 4, in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance. 
While Table 6 shows no meaningful effect of UPK on parent enrollment in schooling or work in 
the previous week, it suggests increase in earnings in the previous year of approximately $5,100 
to $5,500. These estimates are around $500 less than found in the main results, likely because 
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these estimates capture parents who did not yet have access to UPK. Appendix Table A1 shows 
the same sensitivity analysis for subgroup analysis presented in Table 5, with similar findings. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The recent implementation of universal pre-kindergarten in New York City presents a 
promising opportunity to benefit both children and their parents, and to—as indicated by Mayor 
de Blasio—end “the tale of two cities” by lessening economic inequality among city residents 
(Potter, 2015). While research indicates that NYC’s UPK benefits child health (Hong et al., 
2017), and evidence from abroad shows that universal care improves test scores for children 
from single-parent families (Kottelenberg and Lehrer, 2017) and increases adult earnings among 
children who were enrolled (Havnes and Mogstad, 2015), it is not evident that UPK has a 
positive effect on parents. Using data from the American Community Survey, I estimate 
difference-in-difference and triple-difference models to compare education and employment 
outcomes of parents with children eligible for NYC UPK to other groups of similar parents. I 
find no effect on enrollment in schooling or in labor force engagement, although I do find a 
sizeable increase in reported earnings in the previous year. Subgroup analysis reveals that this 
increase in earnings is attributable to increases by families not in poverty and married or 
cohabiting parents. My results therefore suggest that while NYC’s UPK program may benefit 
traditionally more advantaged parents, the program does not improve outcomes for parents in 
poverty and single parents. 
 This study adds to a small but growing body of literature examining the effect of 
universal preschool in the United States on parent outcomes. My findings are aligned with 
Fitzpatrick (2009), who finds that UPK in Georgia and Oklahoma did not have a significant 
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effect on maternal employment. However, these results differ dramatically from Malik’s (2018) 
recent evaluation of Washington, DC’s UPK, which found a 10 percentage point increase in 
maternal labor force participation. This may be, at least in part, due to a difference in treatment 
group definition: while Malik’s treatment group consisted of all mothers with children under the 
age of five years, the sample in my study focused solely on parents with age-eligible (i.e., four 
years old) children. Further, differences from Malik’s findings may also be due to program 
differences, as the DC UPK program is a two-year program, which extends both to three- and 
four-year old children; during the time of my study, NYC’s UPK program only was available to 
children four years of age. The program was extended to encompass three-year-old children 
(called “3K”) in a slow rollout with an increasing number of school districts starting in 2018. 
 The introduction of 3K may benefit parents in the coming years, as two years of universal 
preschool presents greater opportunity for educational and employment gains. However, 
additional program improvements may help parents realize greater benefits in the future. First, 
while a key component of the de Blasio administration included increasing the number of full-
day seats, in many cases “full-day” is a misnomer: most UPK programs end in the mid-afternoon 
when many parents are expected to be working. While many of these programs have early drop-
off and late pick-up options, it is not a requirement to do so. Further, the program is designed to 
run during academic year, and thus may not be compatible for parents to engage in the labor 
force. UPK programs may choose to be open during the summer months but, again, it is not a 
requirement to do so. Thus, there is wide variation in both the hours and the days the programs 
operate, often differing by program type. For example, UPK operated out of community-based 
programs are open an average of 9 hours per day and most are open during the summer, while 
UPK operated out of schools are open an average of 7 hours per day and none are open during 
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the summer (Reid et al., 2019). Finally, as parents are not guaranteed placement in their primary 
program of choice, there may be mismatches between parent preferences, family needs, and UPK 
program. Parents whose children do not receive a seat in a program with extended hours, for 
example, may have a more difficult time pursuing work or education. 
This study should be viewed in light of several limitations. First, the true effect of UPK 
on parental outcomes may be underestimated. As respondents are interviewed for the ACS 
throughout the calendar year, a parent with an age-eligible child who is interviewed in March or 
August, for example, may not have adjusted educational or employment behaviors since UPK 
does not start until September. However, a parent with an age-eligible child who is interviewed 
in December or February, for example, of the academic year in which their child is enrolled in 
UPK may have adjusted his/her behaviors. To address this limitation, future analysis will use 
restricted-use ACS data (application under review). I will conduct a sensitivity test limiting the 
sample to only respondents who answered the survey during the academic year in which the 
child is eligible for UPK. However, I cannot rule out that this sensitivity tests also will provide 
underestimates if parents do not immediately respond to UPK (i.e., if parents take several months 
to begin education or employment).  
Relatedly, the true effect of UPK on parental outcomes may be underestimated for a 
second reason: a parent with an age-eligible child who does not turn four years old until late in 
the year currently is omitted from my analysis. For example, a parent who is interviewed in 
September but whose child does not turn four years old until December would not be included in 
the treatment group of this analysis. Future analysis will use restricted ACS data to access child 
date of birth and more precisely measure UPK eligibility.  
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In addition, parents in this analysis only can be linked to children who live in the same 
household. Thus, my analysis excludes parents not living with their children. While UPK may 
not have a measurable effect on the educational and employment outcomes of non-resident 
parents, I cannot know for sure. Further, I am unable to measure nuances in the type of preschool 
children attend. For example, I cannot discern which parents have children enrolled in schools 
with early drop-off or late pick-up arrangements; parents in these schools may have more 
favorable outcomes by being able to access longer care hours each day.  
My future research on this will topic will use restricted data ACS, which will more 
precisely measure eligibility for UPK. While the present analysis uses child age to measure 
eligibility, restricted-use data analysis will use child birthdate. This will allow for both more 
precise DD and DDD models, and it will allow me to conduct regression discontinuity methods 
around the December 31 age eligibility cutoff. Further, future work should include analysis of 
the 3K program, comparing outcomes for parents who received two years of preschool (3K and 




Table 2—1. Cities included and excluded from analysis 
Cities included in analysis 
  
Los Angeles, CA Charlotte, NC Tucson, AZ 
Chicago, IL Seattle, WA Fresno, CA 
Houston, TX Denver, CO Sacramento, CA 
Philadelphia, PA El Paso, TX Kansas City, KS 
Phoenix, AZ Detroit, MI Long Beach, CA 
San Antonio, TX Boston, MA Mesa, AZ 
San Diego, CA Memphis, TN Virginia Beach, VA 
Dallas, TX Nashville, TN Raleigh, NC 
San Jose, CA Portland, OR Omaha, NE 
San Francisco, CA Las Vegas, NV Oakland, CA 
Indianapolis, IA Louisville, KY Minneapolis, MN 
Columbus, OH Albuquerque, NM Arlington, TX 
 
  
Cities excluded from analysis   
Austin, TX Oklahoma City, OK Miami, FL 
Jacksonville, FL Baltimore, MD Tulsa, OK 
Fort Wayne, IN Milwaukee, WI New Orleans, LA 
Washington, DC Atlanta, GA  
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Table 2—2. Estimated pre-treatment trends 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Control 1:  
Other Large Cities 
Control 2:  
















              
Panel A: Partial implementation (after 2014)  
Trend*NoTreat 0.006 -0.004 233.249    
 (0.009) (0.002) (495.076)    
Trend* NoTreat    -0.001 -0.004 -48.860 
     (0.001) (0.007) (448.082) 
       
Observations 100,003 100,003 100,003 100,003 100,003 100,003 
R-squared 0.025 0.158 0.233 0.025 0.158 0.233 
              
Panel B: Full implementation (after 2015)  
Trend* NoTreat 0.001 -0.004 470.905    
 (0.001) -0.004 (338.271)    
Trend* NoTreat    -0.001 -0.000 -319.547 
     (0.001) (0.002) (306.906) 
       
Observations 123,050 123,050 123,050 123,050 123,050 123,050 
R-squared 0.023 0.160 0.232 0.023 0.160 0.232 
 
Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Public Use Microdata Sample, 2005-2014 (Panel 
A) and 2005-2015 (Panel B) 
Notes: All models control for the following covariates: parent sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, 
age, age-squared; age of the youngest child in the household; number of children in the 
household; and household size. All models include year and city fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at city level. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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NYC & Youngest Child 
Age 4  
Control 1:  
Other Large Cities 
  
Control 2:  
Youngest Child Under 
Age 4 
  Pre-UPK Post-UPK Pre-UPK Post-UPK Pre-UPK Post-UPK 
Outcome Variables       
   Enrollment in  0.055 0.050 0.072 0.064* 0.058 0.053 
      schooling (0.228) (0.218) (0.258) (0.245) (0.234) (0.225) 
   Worked last week 0.682 0.703 0.706 0.722** 0.656 0.685*** 
 (0.466) (0.457) (0.456) (0.448) (0.475) (0.465) 







      months (73,947.94) (98,529.04) (58,001.78) (66,846.45) (87,613.68) (87,933.90) 
       
Parent Characteristics       
Female 0.566 0.562 0.549 0.551 0.550 0.551 
 (0.496) (0.496) (0.498) (0.497) (0.497) (0.497) 
Race       
    White 0.389 0.371 0.606 0.556*** 0.440 0.414*** 
 (0.487) (0.483) (0.489) (0.497) (0.496) (0.493) 
    Black 0.244 0.214** 0.121 0.117 0.206 0.193** 
 (0.430) (0.410) (0.327) (0.321) (0.404) (0.394) 
    Asian 0.143 0.179*** 0.104 0.142*** 0.152 0.189*** 
 (0.350) (0.383) (0.305) (0.349) (0.359) (0.392) 
    Other 0.224 0.237 0.169 0.185*** 0.203 0.204 
 (0.417) (0.425) (0.374) (0.388) (0.402) (0.403) 
Hispanic ethnicity 0.353 0.335 0.409 0.407 0.315 0.300** 
 (0.478) (0.472) (0.492) (0.491) (0.465) (0.458) 
Marital status       
    Married 0.749 0.767 0.766 0.763 0.784 0.803*** 
 (0.433) (0.423) (0.423) (0.425) (0.412) (0.398) 
    Cohabiting 0.067 0.062 0.082 0.092** 0.067 0.069 
 (0.249) (0.242) (0.274) (0.289) (0.250) (0.253) 
    Single 0.184 0.171 0.152 0.145 0.149 0.129*** 
 (0.387) (0.377) (0.359) (0.353) (0.356) (0.335) 
Age 40.071 41.601*** 38.465 39.343*** 37.479 38.357*** 
 (10.797) (11.526) (10.296) (10.675) (10.664) (11.010) 
       
Household Characteristics      
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Age of youngest 
child 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 1.341 1.344 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.097) (1.081) 
Number of children 1.108 1.105 1.106 1.091*** 1.447 1.431** 
 (0.324) (0.307) (0.324) (0.304) (4.772) (4.823) 
Household size 4.621 4.660 4.615 4.594 4.772 4.823* 
 (1.676) (1.667) (1.637) (1.589) (1.889) (1.988) 
             
Observations 6,045 1,693 22357 9,793 34,267 9,787 
 
Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Public Use Microdata Sample, 2005-2017 
Notes: UPK=universal pre-kindergarten. Estimates represent weighted means (number of 
observations is unweighted). Standard deviations in parentheses. Asterisks represent significant 
differences between pre-UPK and post-UPK values. Pre and post use dates of full implantation: 
pre-UPK is 2005-2015 and post-UPK is 2016-2017.  





Table 2—4. Estimated effect of universal pre-kindergarten on parent education and employment 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 


























Treatment  0.007 0.000 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.003 
   effect (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
       
Observations 39,888 51,792 262,404 39,888 51,792 262,404 
R-squared 0.050 0.038 0.040 0.175 0.186 0.182 
 
  (7) (8) (9) 














Treatment  3,534.616 6,076.910* 5,846.310* 
   effect (2,550.818) (2,747.512) (2,866.575) 
    
Observations 39,888 51,792 262,404 
R-squared 0.229 0.254 0.231 
 
Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Public Use Microdata Sample, 2005-2017 
Notes: DD=difference-in-difference. DDD=triple difference. See notes to Table 1 for 
information on control variables. All models include year and city fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at city level.  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 67 
 
Table 2—5. Subgroup analysis of the effect of universal pre-kindergarten on parent education 
and employment 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Enrolled 

















Households in Poverty 
  
Households Not in Poverty 
  
Treatment  -0.001 -0.007 -726.567 0.001 0.006 7,362.509* 
   effect (0.024) (0.043) (660.953) (0.009) (0.017) (3,422.737) 
       
Observations 48,407 48,407 48,407 213,997 213,997 213,997 
R-squared 0.068 0.167 0.175 0.037 0.197 0.224 







Treatment  0.003 -0.007 2,414.695 0.000 0.021 8,921.249 
   effect (0.013) (0.027) (2,953.949) (0.011) (0.020) (4,941.241) 
       
Observations 142,497 142,497 142,497 119,907 119,907 119,907 
R-squared 0.043 0.075 0.135 0.038 0.159 0.262 







Treatment  -0.030 -0.097 -2,991.055 0.006 0.028 7,487.365* 
   effect (0.030) (0.094) (3,731.348) (0.009) (0.018) (3,317.626) 
       
Observations 29,481 29,481 29,481 232,923 232,923 232,923 
R-squared 0.067 0.124 0.154 0.035 0.200 0.233 
 
Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Public Use Microdata Sample, 2005-2017 
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for information on control variables. All models include state fixed 




Table 2—6. Sensitivity testing of the effect of universal pre-kindergarten on parent education and 
employment (partial implementation) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 


























Treatment  0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.020 0.004 0.009 
   effect (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
       
Observations 39,888 51,792 262,404 39,888 51,792 262,404 
R-squared 0.05 0.038 0.04 0.175 0.186 0.183 
 
  (7) (8) (9) 














Treatment  2,460.486 5,545.843* 5,121.364* 
   effect (2,090.221) (2,228.756) (2,348.099) 
    
Observations 39,888 51,792 262,404 
R-squared 0.23 0.254 0.24 
 
Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Public Use Microdata Sample, 2005-2017 
Notes: DD=difference-in-difference. DDD=triple difference. See notes to Table 1 for 
information on control variables. All models include year and city fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at city level.  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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Appendix 
Table 2—A1. Subgroup analysis of the effect of universal pre-kindergarten on parent education 
and employment 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Enrolled 















Panel A  
Households in Poverty 
  
Households Not in Poverty 
  
Treatment  0.011 -0.025 -264.757 -0.001 0.011 5,704.120* 
   effect (0.019) (0.037) (584.620) (0.008) (0.016) (2,839.570) 
       
Observations 48,407 48,407 48,407 213,997 213,997 213,997 
R-squared 0.068 0.167 0.176 0.037 0.197 0.224 







Treatment  0.007 -0.000 2,661.463 -0.006 0.027 7,804.198 
   effect (0.012) (0.024) (2,406.980) (0.009) (0.018) (4,118.394) 
       
Observations 142,497 142,497 142,497 119,907 119,907 119,907 
R-squared 0.043 0.075 0.135 0.038 0.159 0.262 







Treatment  -0.024 -0.065 -3,170.844 0.004 0.026 6,532.862* 
   effect (0.025) (0.042) (3,150.899) (0.008) (0.017) (2,726.122) 
       
Observations 29,481 29,481 29,481 232,923 232,923 232,923 
R-squared 0.067 0.124 0.154 0.035 0.200 0.233 
 
Source: American Community Survey 1-Year Public Use Microdata Sample, 2005-2017 
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for information on control variables. All models include state fixed 




VIII. PAPER 3: The Effects of Lengthening Childcare Subsidy Eligibility on Parental Labor 
Market and Education Outcomes 
 
Abstract 
Congress’s 2014 reauthorization of the Child Care and Development Block Grant 
(CCDBG) made several changes to promote childcare stability for families who receive subsidies 
through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), including lengthening the minimum 
eligibility period for subsidies from 6 to 12 months. This forced some states to expand their 
eligibility periods in response to the policy change. Using CCDF Administrative Data linked to 
the Urban Institute’s CCDF Policies Database, this study uses data from nine expansion states to 
examine whether lengthened eligibility periods affect parental income, work status, and 
educational enrollment. The policy change had no effect on average parental income while 
decreasing the share of parents employed, suggesting that parents who worked after the policy 
change did so at a higher wage and/or for more hours. Further, the policy change increased work 
engagement in single-parent households and increased enrollment in school by 3.3 percentage 
points among parents on average. This latter result suggests that the expansion of eligibility 
periods, with the assurance of increased stability in subsidy receipt, facilitated parents’ human 




Childcare programs are a critical component of the safety net, as the majority of 
American households rely on some form of childcare while parents are engaged in employment 
or schooling. Estimates indicate that 60 to over 75 percent of young children attend some form of 
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regular childcare (Hipp et al., 2017; Laughlin, 2013), ranging from center-based care to licensed 
and unlicensed care arrangements in homes. The share of children enrolled in some form of care 
has risen dramatically in recent decades following two substantial changes in household 
demographics. First, increasing numbers of women have entered the labor force since the 1970s 
and dual-earner households have become the most prevalent family structure, with just over half 
of all family households falling into this category; second, the number of single-parent families 
has dramatically increased in the same period, with approximately a quarter of families headed 
by a single parent, most of whom are women (Blau and Winkler, 2017; Hipp et al., 2017; 
Western et al., 2012).  
As the number of children enrolled in childcare has risen, so have household expenditures 
on childcare, particularly for families with young children (Herbst, 2018). The price of childcare 
is particularly burdensome for low-income families, who spend a disproportionate amount of 
their income on these arrangements (Laughlin, 2013). In nearly every state in the country, the 
average cost of childcare for a family of four exceeds the cost of housing, college tuition, 
transportation, food, or healthcare (Child Care Aware of America, 2018). In the majority of 
states, the average cost of childcare exceeds half of family income for families living at or below 
the poverty line, and is around 30 to 40 percent of family income for families at 150 percent of 
the poverty line (Child Care Aware of America, 2018). Low-income parents therefore face a 
difficult choice, as the cost of childcare may be prohibitively expensive to allow their 
engagement in employment or education. 
Though childcare is largely seen as a private responsibility in American society until 
children enter public school around age five (Chaudry et al., 2017; Craig and Mullan, 2010), the 
federal government has taken steps to help support low-income families in affording childcare. 
 72 
The Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) was created as part of the 1996 welfare 
reform, both increasing federal funding for childcare and combining several existing programs 
into the CCDBG (Davis et al., 2017). Childcare subsidies are part of the Child Care and 
Development Fund (CCDF), which is primarily funded through CCDBG. CCDF focuses on 
providing high-quality and affordable care options for low-income families (Henly et al., 2017), 
yet the high administrative burden associated with receiving and maintain receipt of a subsidy 
often results in instability for families.  
When CCDBG was reauthorized by Congress in 2014, a new emphasis was placed on 
providing stable care arrangements for low-income families through the CCDF subsidy program 
(Davis et al., 2017). One of the means of achieving this goal was to increase the minimum length 
of time that families are eligible for subsidies from 6 months to 12 months. This change was 
intended to assure parents they could retain their subsidy for a year even if their employment or 
school status changed. 
As the 2014 CCBDG reauthorization is relatively recent, limited research exists on how 
the changes mandated in the legislation have impacted families receiving CCDF subsidies. 
Existing evidence on childcare stability suggests that increased stability may improve parental 
outcomes (Chaudry et al., 2017; Forry and Hofferth, 2011; Ha and Miller, 2015; Herbst and 
Tekin, 2011; Zanoni and Weinberger, 2015). This study is the first to examine the effects of 
lengthened CCDF eligibility periods, in the states that changed their CCDF policies in response 
to the 2014 CCBDG reauthorization, on parental income, employment, and enrollment in 
schooling. I use 2009 to 2015 CCDF Administrative Data, which consists of monthly data for 
either the population of or a representative sample of subsidy recipients in each state, linked to 
the Urban Institute’s CCDF Policies Database, which provides a rich set of yearly state policy 
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measures. I exploit the natural experiment resulting from the 2014 CCBDG reauthorization, 
using difference-in-difference methods to examine the relationship between lengthened subsidy 
eligibility periods and parent outcomes.  
Overall, I find that lengthened eligibility periods resulted in no change in average 
parental income among CCDF recipient families and a decrease in average parental employment. 
When considering only single-parent CCDF recipient families, however, the policy change 
increased work engagement. The policy change resulted in a 3.3 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of parental enrollment in education, suggesting that longer periods of subsidy 
eligibility facilitated parental investment in human capital.  
 
Background 
For working parents, childcare is a primary potential source of instability: who will take 
care of the children while parents are at work? This instability is heavily concentrated amongst 
low-income families (Adams and Rohacek, 2010; Chaudry, 2004). The average child attends 
seven different care arrangements before turning three years old (Morrissey, 2009)—implying 
that low-income children attend more than seven, as they tend to be in less stable care 
arrangements. This may be due, at least in part, to the high price of childcare, as low-income 
families spend a disproportionate amount of their income on care. In 2011, families overall spent 
an average of 7 percent of income on childcare, but low-income families spent 30 percent or 
more on childcare (Laughlin, 2013). While some families do receive childcare subsidies to offset 
some or all of the cost of care, instability in subsidy receipt is common (Grobe et al., 2017, 2008; 
Henly et al., 2017).  
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Though subsidy receipt theoretically should lead to more stable arrangements, because a 
guarantee of payment to childcare providers should enable greater access to care by low-income 
families, this is often not the case. Krafft, Davis, and Tout (2017) use matched survey data and 
administrative data from Minnesota to examine the impact of subsidy receipt on stability of care 
arrangements, finding no effect. In other words, receiving a subsidy does not necessarily lead to 
care arrangement stability. This may be due, at least in part, to the administrative processes and 
issues in implementation of childcare subsidies, which can lead to subsidy exits by hindering the 
process of eligibility renewal (Henly et al., 2017). Many families experience exits or breaks in 
subsidy receipt, with average length of subsidy receipt tending to be similar to the length of 
eligibility prior to recertification (Davis et al., 2017; Pilarz et al., 2016). This implies that the 
recertification process impedes continuation of subsidy receipt, and that longer periods of 
eligibility prior to recertification may result in more stable receipt.  
Henly et al. (2017) also provide evidence on the link between eligibility length and 
arrangement stability, examining why families experience a break in subsidy receipt while 
remaining income-eligible. Using administrative and survey data from Illinois and New York 
over an 18-month period, the authors estimate the hazard of program exit. They find that families 
living in an area with a shorter eligibility period have a greater hazard of program exit than 
families in areas with longer eligibility periods, and that families who faced lengthy approval 
periods or substantial challenges in the application process are more likely to exit subsidy receipt 
while still eligible. Taken together, these findings indicate that subsidy program factors are 
closely linked to subsidy exit, and that establishing program rules that lengthen eligibility may 
increase stability. 
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Despite the challenges that many families face in receiving and maintaining subsidies, 
those who do so often see substantial benefits. Access to reliable, high-quality, stable childcare 
has the potential to improve a variety of parent and child outcomes, including parental 
employment (Chaudry et al., 2017), earnings (Zanoni and Weinberger, 2015), and education 
(Herbst and Tekin, 2011). Using four years of administrative data from Wisconsin, Ha and 
Miller (2015) examine outcomes for mothers from both single-parent and two-parent households 
who applied and were deemed eligible for childcare subsidies from March 2000 to February 
2001. The authors find that—except for families with short periods (one to six months) of 
subsidy receipt—subsidy receipt is associated with increased earnings. As the number of months 
of receipt increases (i.e., the stability of receipt increases), so do associated increases in earnings. 
Receiving a subsidy is associated with a 46 percent higher relative risk of an increase in earnings 
for mothers with 7-12 months of subsidy receipt, compared to mothers with no receipt. 
Receiving a subsidy for 13-24 months or more than 25 months is associated with a 2.16 or 2.89 
times higher relative risk of increased earnings. This evidence indicates longer periods of subsidy 
receipt may result in more positive maternal employment outcomes; longer periods of eligibility 
may have the same effect. 
Improved maternal labor market outcomes from subsidy receipt can have far-reaching 
consequences, as approximately 1.4 million children from 875,000 low-income families receive 
funding for subsidized childcare from the CCDF subsidies per month (Ha and Miller, 2015; 
Henly et al., 2017). To be eligible for a subsidy, families must meet income, child age, and 
employment (or education or training) requirements (Grobe et al., 2017).  
Yet, despite serving over a million children per month, receipt of subsidies amongst 
eligible families is low, with only an estimated 15 to 30 percent of families who quality for 
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subsidies receiving one (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Herbst, 2008). Due to the high 
administrative burden associated with subsidy receipt and renewal, it is reasonable to infer that 
subsidy recipients are different from eligible non-recipients in important ways. Research bears 
this out, finding that subsidy recipients tend to be more advantaged than eligible non-recipients: 
subsidy recipients generally have higher family incomes and greater fluency in the English 
language, worry less about the cost of childcare and more about convenience, and are less likely 
than eligible non-recipients to report having experienced food insecurity or to have children 
under the age of six in the home (Johnson et al., 2011). This makes research pertaining to 
subsidy recipients particularly challenging, as large population surveys that do not directly 
observe subsidy receipt capture a large share of eligible non-recipients, while analysis only with 
subsidy recipients may suffer from selection bias due to the more advantaged nature of subsidy 
recipients as compared to eligible non-recipients. The ideal counterfactual group to which 
subsidy recipients should be compared is difficult to determine in many data sets, and 
researchers have taken varied approaches to this problem. Previous studies have examined 
subsidy recipients in isolation (e.g., Ha & Miller, 2015),  in comparison to eligible non-recipients 
(e.g., Zanoni & Weinberger, 2015), or in comparison to other larger groups such as households 
with young children (e.g., Malik, 2018). While the choice of counterfactual group is limited by 
available data, it is nonetheless an important consideration in this line of research. 
2014 CCDF Reauthorization 
In an effort to reform some of the shortcomings associated with the CCDF—such as the 
administrative burden associated with recertifying eligibility—a new emphasis was placed on 
providing stable care arrangements for low-income families when CCDBG was reauthorized by 
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Congress in 2014 (Davis et al., 2017). This was done partly through expanding the minimum 
length of eligibility in CCDF subsidies. 
The 2014 expansion had differential effects by state, because there is wide variation in 
childcare subsidy programs by state, particularly in terms of eligibility and recertification 
timelines and requirements (Davis et al., 2017; Henly et al., 2017). Prior to the 2014 
reauthorization, half of all states required recertification of eligible households every six months; 
the reauthorization, however, required all states to restructure recertification guidelines so that no 
family was required to recertify more than once per year (Grobe et al., 2017). States also differ 
drastically in terms of income eligibility limits, the rates at which childcare providers are paid, 
and the maximum copay amounts for parent (Grobe et al., 2017). Further, while some states 
permit subsidy receipt if parents are actively job searching, others only allow job searching 
activities for up to one month or for families who are already receiving subsidies (Stevens et al., 
2015). Over half of all states also require a minimum number of hours per week in work 
activities to receive a subsidy, and many—but not all—have waiting lists for subsidies (Stevens 
et al., 2015). This state-level variation allows for the estimation of the effect of longer eligibility 
periods on CCDF recipient families, as staggered changes in eligibility policies across states 
create a natural experiment. 
In summary, the reauthorization of CCDF in 2014 brought about important changes in 
recertification requirements, as states now can require eligibility recertification no more than 
once every 12 months. Existing literature suggests that this policy change should result in 
positive impacts on the length of subsidy receipt, as longer periods of eligibility are linked to 
longer spells of subsidy receipt. In turn, longer spells of subsidy receipt may have positive 
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impacts on both child and parent outcomes, including parental employment and education. Until 
now, the effects of this policy change on parental outcomes have not been examined. 
 
Data and Measures 
To explore the effect of lengthened childcare subsidy eligibility periods on parental 
outcomes, I link individual-level CCDF Administrative Data to state-level data from the Urban 
Institute’s CCDF Policies Database for Federal Fiscal Years (FFY) 2009 to 2016. CCDF 
Administrative Data, also known as ACF-801 Data, is available from the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, and consists of monthly 
data for either the population of or a representative sample of subsidy recipients in each state. 
This results in over 1.6 million observations across all years of data, which both provides 
adequate statistical power to detect small effects and allows for an examination of subgroup 
effects without compromising sample size.  
The Urban Institute’s CCDF Policies Database is designed to capture the nuances in 
state-level CCDF policies; as these policies frequently change, state-level fixed effects may not 
adequately capture differences between state policy environments. Critical to this analysis, the 
CCDF Policies Database measures a wide array of state-specific policies over time, including the 
length of the eligibility period. This variable allows me to identify the exact month and year after 
CCDBG reauthorization in which states changed from 6-month eligibility periods to 12-month 
eligibility periods. I link the CCDF Policies Database to CCDF Administrative Data, which 
allows analysis of individual-level data in the context of state-year policy measures. 
 Outcome variables come from CCDF Administrative Data, including measures of 
monthly household income (a continuous dollar amount, adjusted to 2016 dollars), whether any 
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part of the household income comes from employment (a binary variable, where 1 indicates that 
some portion of household income is from employment), and the reason that the household is 
receiving subsidized childcare. Families may receive subsidized childcare for any of the 
following reasons: employment, education, both employment and education, protective services, 
or a federally-declare emergency. The vast majority (over 95 percent) in any given month 
receive CCDF funding for employment, education, or both. I use three binary variables to 
examine these outcomes, where 1 indicates whether the parent is participating in employment 
only, whether the parent is participating in education only, or whether the parent is participating 
in both employment and education. The dataset also includes state of residence, month, and year 
for each observation. Combined with the data on eligibility periods from the CCDF Policies 
Database, these measures allow identification of parents who lived in states that changed their 
eligibility periods in response to CCDBG reauthorization, both before and after these changes. 
I control for individual-level characteristics with measures from CCDF Administrative 
Data, including monthly childcare co-payment amount, family size, single parent status, type of 
childcare setting (in-home, family/group home, or center-based), total number of hours of care 
child received during the reporting month, payment amount to the childcare provider, and the 
age, race/ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, or other), and sex of the 
child receiving the subsidy. I also control for whether the state submitted information on a 
representative sample of CCDF recipients, rather than on all recipients.  
Using state-level data from the CCDF Policies Database, I control for characteristics of 
each state’s policy. I include measures in four domains. First, I control for eligibility 
requirements: the family income eligibility and continuing eligibility thresholds for each family 
size, the maximum age at which a child can receive a CCDF subsidy, the minimum number of 
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hours that parents must work each week to receive a CCDF subsidy, and approved parental 
activities for eligibility (job search, high school, GED courses, English as a second language 
courses, vocational training, postsecondary education, housing search, and participation in SNAP 
or TANF work activities). Second, I include measures of application submission, such as in-
person, mail, fax, email online, and/or phone. Third, I include the criteria for authorization, 
including whether documentation is required to verify the applicant’s identity, household 
composition verification, relationship to the child, employment/number of work hours, or child’s 
immunization record. Finally, I include family copayment rules, including the minimum 




The timing of changes in subsidy eligibility periods across states provides a natural 
experiment, as many states went from 6-month to 12-month eligibility periods in response to the 
CCBDG reauthorization while others were unaffected. I use a difference-in-difference (DD) 
specification to approximate a causal estimation of the effect of lengthened subsidy eligibility 
periods on parental labor market and educational outcomes. A key question in this specification 
concerns the appropriate counterfactual group to use for comparison to the treatment group, 
where the treatment group is defined as parents of children receiving CCDF subsidies in the nine 
states—Arizona, Connecticut, Iowa, Indiana, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and 
Texas—that changed to 12-month eligibility periods after CCDBG reauthorization.  
DD specifications typically define the counterfactual group as states that had no change 
in policy. For the purposes of my analysis, this group could be either states that already had 
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eligibility periods of at least 12 months prior to the CCDBG reauthorization for the entirety of 
the observed data (“always” states) or states that did not lengthen their eligibility periods to 12 
months by the regulatory deadline in FFY 2016 (“never” states).6 However, the “always” states 
may be systematically different from the treatment states in important ways. In particular, they 
may have policy environments that are friendlier to CCDF recipients and to subsidy stability, and 
these environments may manifest throughout the system. I therefore use the “never” states 
(Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and West Virginia) as the primary counterfactual 
for DD analysis.  
To conduct the DD analysis, I estimate the equation, 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑆𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       (1), 
where Y is the dependent variable for individual i living in state j in year t. TREAT is an indicator 
variable set to 1 (0) for individuals living in a treatment (control) state, and POST is an indicator 
variable set to 1 (0) for observations living in states after (before) they lengthened the eligibility 
period to 12 months. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of individual-level control variables, 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is a vector of state-
level policy control variables, and 𝑇𝑡and 𝑆𝑗 are vectors of year and state fixed effects. The term 
𝛽1 indicates the DD estimator. All standard errors are clustered on the state-month level. 
 Because of the wide variety in state policy landscapes, it is likely that average effects 
across states obscures individual differences between states. As such, I also estimate equation (1) 
 
6 Though federal guidelines set September 30, 2016 (i.e., the end of FFY 2016) as the date by 
which eligibility periods had to be lengthened, several states were late to comply. Alaska and 
Arkansas implemented 12-month eligibility periods in FFY 2017; Illinois, Minnesota, and West 
Virginia did so in FFY 2018. Hawaii is scheduled to implement 12-month eligibility periods in 
FFY 2020. 
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using a set of TREAT*POST variables for each state to replace the single aggregate 
TREAT*POST term. This shows variation in the treatment effect by state. 
 A primary assumption for a valid DD estimation is that of parallel pre-treatment trends. 
This assumption is necessary to indicate whether, the absence of the policy change, the trends in 
parental outcomes in the nine state states that lengthened their eligibility periods were similar to 
those in the control states prior to the policy changes. I test the assumption of parallel pre-
treatment trends using the model, 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1(𝑇𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝐶)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑁𝐶 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡     (2), 
where TR is a linear time trend prior to the policy change in each state and C is an indicator 
variable set to 1 (0) for states when they are in the control (treatment) group. The term 𝛿1 
estimates whether the pre-treatment trend is significantly different between states; an 
insignificant and near-zero pre-treatment trend indicates that the parallel trends assumption is 
satisfied. 
 A particular advantage of the large sample size of the CCDF dataset is that it allows for 
subpopulation analysis to examine heterogeneity in outcomes across subgroups of parents. Based 
on prior literature, I examine differences in outcomes of parents who are single vs. those with 
partners, by race/ethnicity, by the age of the youngest child in the household, and by type of 
childcare used.  
Finally, I test the sensitivity of the primary DD models in two ways. First, I address the 
issue of the appropriate counterfactual to use in analysis. I follow Dynarski (2004) by exploiting 
the staggered timing of the states that changed their eligibility lengths in response to the CCDBG 
reauthorization to conduct a first-difference analysis. The states that changed their length of 
eligibility periods serve as both treatment and control groups. Table 1 displays the FFY in which 
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each of these states lengthened their eligibility policies, as well as whether the policy change also 
included any exceptions to the 12-month eligibility rule. Figure 1 shows the identification 
strategy visually. From FFY 2009 to FFY 2016, all nine of these states are in the control group, 
as none of them changed the length of their eligibility period prior to FFY 2016. Nevada is the 
first state to move into the treatment group in March 2015, followed by Connecticut in July 
2015, Oregon in October 2015, and so forth.  
Additionally, a second sensitivity test ideally would be conducted using the CCDF 
Administrative Data, where I estimate the same DD models as the primary results but change the 
counterfactual from the never states to the always states. However, the always states have large 
and generally significantly different pre-treatment trends, as shown in Appendix Table A1, and 
therefore are inappropriate for use in DD specifications.  
Second, I conduct a secondary analysis using a population sample of households eligible 
for CCDF subsidies from the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year Public Use Microdata 
Sample (PUMS). As the CCDF Administrative Data is a selected sample of only households 
receiving subsidies, my primary analysis may suffer from selection bias if the families who 
receive CCDF subsidies are systematically different from those who are eligible non-recipients, 
or if improved eligibility rules induce entry into subsidy. Thus, a population-level analysis with 
ACS data provides a potentially less biased estimate. However, due to the low CCDF subsidy 
receipt rates among eligible households, effects may be hard to detect within the population; for 
this reason, the estimates from ACS data do not constitute my primary analysis. The ACS is an 
ongoing national survey, with the 1-year PUMS representing a sample of approximately 1 
percent of the U.S. population living in areas with populations greater than 65,000. While I 
cannot observe which households receive CCDF subsidies in the ACS data, I simulate a measure 
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of eligibility by using household income and the number of people in the household as compared 
to the income eligibility thresholds by family size set by each state. I estimate the same DD 
models as in equation (1) with this ACS sample, with the following outcomes: family income, 
whether the respondent worked in the week prior to the survey, whether the respondent is 
currently enrolled in school, and whether the respondent both worked in the prior week and is 
currently enrolled in school. Though these outcomes are slightly different from the measures in 
the CCDF Administrative Data, they provide a reasonable comparison by which to judge the 




 To proceed with the DD analysis, it is necessary to satisfy the assumption of parallel pre-
treatment trends. Table 1 shows the estimated pre-treatment trends for the CCDF Administrative 
Data. An insignificant and near-zero pre-treatment trend indicates that the parallel trends 
assumption is satisfied. Across all outcomes, none of the trends are statistically significant. 
Family income is seen in Column (1). These estimates indicate that the average family in a non-
treatment state reported $6.34 less per month than the average family in a treatment state prior to 
the policy change. Though this coefficient is not as close to zero as other pre-trend estimates, it is 
small relative to the income reported in each period, and insignificant, and thus does not indicate 
a threat to inference. Columns (2) through (5) show that the difference between control and 
treatment states before the policy change was essentially zero for outcomes examining the share 
of families receiving incoming from work and the reason for CCDF receipt. These estimates 
 85 
indicate that DD is an appropriate estimation model and inference will not be biased by a 
violation of the parallel trends assumption. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the primary sample of parents from the states 
that changed eligibility length after CCDBG reauthorization, as well as the control states that 
have not yet changed their policies, both before and after the policy change went into effect. On 
average, parents in treatment and control states saw an increase in monthly household income 
after policies changed. While there was no change in the percentage of parents reporting 
receiving income from work in treatment states, in control states there was an increase of 4.6 
percentage points in this figure. Across both treatment and control states, more parents reported 
receiving CCDF to engage in work after the policy change and fewer parents reported receiving 
CCDF to enroll in school. The share of parents receiving CCDF to work and enroll in school 
simultaneously decreased in treatment and control states. 
Turning to household characteristics, we see that the average family size increased 
slightly in control states from before to after the policy change, and that control states had larger 
families than treatment states in both periods. There were slightly more single parent households 
in treatment states than control states, and the age of the average child—around five years old—
increased after the policy change as well, though only significantly in control states. There were 
more white non-Hispanic and Hispanic children and fewer black non-Hispanic children in the 
control state sample both before and after the policy than in the treatment state sample. Slightly 
less than half of all children were female in both the treatment and control group across both 
time periods. 
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Childcare characteristics differ before and after the policy changes across treatment and 
control states in several notable ways. First, the payments made to providers statistically stayed 
the same in treatment states before and after the policy change; in contrast, provider payments 
increased from $394.70 to $442.41 in control states. There were more children in center-based 
care and fewer children in family/group home care arrangements both before and after the policy 
change in treatment states as compared to control states. Further, while the average child in a 
treatment state spent approximately 20 fewer hours per month in care after the policy changes, 
the number of hours spent in care for children in control states increased only marginally. 
Finally, the average monthly family copayment amount increased by approximately $19 after the 
policy changes in treatment states but increased by about $10 in control states. 
Primary Models 
Primary DD results using CCDF Administrative Data are shown in Table 3. Odd-
numbered columns show the aggregate effect of the policy changes across all the states that 
changed; even-numbered columns show effects that are allowed to vary by state. Average 
estimates across treatment states indicate no significant change in income, though state-specific 
results paint a more nuanced picture: in Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, average incomes 
rose by over $100 per month, while in Iowa, Arizona, and South Dakota, average monthly 
incomes fell. The share of households reporting receiving any income from work in a given 
month fell by 3.4 percentage points on average after the policy change, and by more than 5 
percentage points in Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas.  
Turning to estimates concerning the stated reason for subsidy receipt, shown in Columns 
4 through 10, I find a 1.5 percentage point decrease in the average share of parents working after 
the policy change and a 3.3 percentage point increase in parents enrolled in school. I also find, on 
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average, a 1.8 percentage point decrease in parents both working and enrolled in school 
simultaneously. Turning to state-level estimates, I find a similar pattern. In Connecticut, Oregon, 
and South Dakota, the rate of work among parents receiving a childcare subsidy decreased, while 
the rate of school enrollment increased. Estimates in Column 10 for parents jointly working and 
enrolled in school are more variable at the state level, with results indicating that rates increased 
in some states (Iowa and Indiana) and decreased in others (Nevada and Pennsylvania). 
Stratified Models 
 As there is wide heterogeneity amongst recipients of CCDF subsidies, it is important to 
estimate outcomes by subsample to examine differences across groups. These results are shown 
in Figures 2 through 5. In each of these figures, the marker represents the coefficient estimate 
and the whiskers represent the 95 percent confidence interval on each estimate. Estimates with 
non-overlapping whiskers are significantly different from one another; estimates with whiskers 
that do overlap zero are not significantly different from zero.  
Figure 2 shows results by partner status for average estimates across all nine treatment 
states, comparing estimates for single-parent families to those with families in which the parent 
is married or partnered. Results indicate no significant difference in the change in income 
between single-parent households and partnered households, but that the rate of reporting income 
from work declined in both types of households. Unlike overall overages, I find that the rate of 
receiving subsidies for work increased by 4.7 percentage points in single-parent households. In 
contrast, the rate of receiving subsidies for work decreased by 2.2 percentage points in partnered 
households. In both single-parent and partnered households, receipt of subsidy for school 
enrollment increased while receipt of subsidy for both work and school simultaneously 
decreased. 
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 Figure 3 displays results by child race, Figure 4 displays results by child age, and Figure 
5 displays results by type of childcare arrangement. Results from both figures generally align 
with average estimates: I find no significant evidence that longer periods of subsidy eligibility 
resulted in changes in income; suggestive evidence that the policy change decreases the share of 
recipients receiving income from work, receiving a subsidy for work, and receiving a subsidy for 
both work and schooling; and significant evidence that the policy change increases the share of 
recipients receiving a subsidy to enroll in schooling. None of the results are precise enough to be 
statistically different from one another, indicating no meaningful difference in outcomes by child 
race or age. Notable in Figure 5 is that point estimates indicate the smallest effects for parents 
with a child in center-based care, while the largest effects tend to be concentrated on parents with 
a child in-home care. 
Sensitivity Testing: First Differences 
 I conduct two tests of the sensitivity of these estimates. First, I use the staggered timing 
of the policy change to estimate first-difference results using only the treatment states. Appendix 
Table A2 shows the first-difference estimates in which I only include states that changed their 
eligibility policies (i.e., treatment states), comparing outcomes before and after the change as 
staggered over time. Though most of the results are not significant, the pattern is similar to that 
of the primary results. There was no significant change in income after the policy change; while 
the point estimates from the first-differences estimates indicate a decrease in income (as 
compared to an increase in income from the primary DD estimates), these estimates have large 
standard errors and are therefore imprecise. Turning to employment, the first-differences 
estimates indicate a decrease both in the share of households receiving income from work, and in 
the share of households receiving a subsidy for work; while not significant, these estimates are of 
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the same sign and similar (though slightly smaller) magnitude as the primary DD results.  I find a 
3.1 percentage point increase in receiving a subsidy for school enrollment, closely mirroring the 
3.3 percentage point increase from the primary DD results in Table 3. There was a 1.2 
percentage point decrease in the share of parents receiving a subsidy for simultaneous work and 
school enrollment, which is slightly smaller in magnitude than the 1.8 percentage point decrease 
in my primary results. State-level first-difference estimates also closely follow the primary DD 
results in sign and in precision, though again are generally somewhat smaller in magnitude. 
Sensitivity Testing: ACS Data 
In the second sensitivity test, I use ACS data to estimate similar models to the primary 
DD models, though with slightly different outcomes to accommodate the difference in measures 
across data sets. Appendix Table A3 shows the estimated pre-treatment trends with this data. 
Across all outcomes, none of the trends are statistically significant. On average, family income in 
the past 12 months, shown in Column 1, was $1.11 greater in non-treatment states than in 
treatment states prior to the policy change. Columns 2 through 4 show that the difference 
between control and treatment states before the policy change was essentially zero for outcomes 
examining whether the respondent worked last week, whether the respondent was enrolled in 
school at the time of the survey, and whether the respondent both worked and was enrolled in 
school. These estimates indicate that DD is an appropriate estimation model and inference will 
not be biased by a violation of the parallel trends assumption. 
As anticipated, DD estimates using ACS data produce less precise results, due to the low 
subsidy participation rate among eligible families (Appendix Table A4). Point estimates of 
average effects across all states, shown in the first row, follow a similar pattern to the primary 
results, though they have large standard errors and therefore are not significant. These point 
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estimates suggest that after the lengthening of eligibility periods, family income across all 
eligible households was unchanged, while the share of parents in eligible families working 
decreased and the share of share of parents in eligible families enrolled in school increased. 
However, ACS estimates differ from results using CCDF Administrative Data in that there was a 
suggestive increase in the share of parents both working and enrolled in schooling.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
 In an effort to promote childcare arrangement stability, the 2014 Congressional 
reauthorization of CCDF funding within the CCBDG Act lengthened the minimum eligibility 
period for CCDF subsidies for low-income families from 6 months to 12 months. While many 
states already had a 12-month eligibility window, some states were forced to expand their 
eligibility periods in response to the reauthorization. Using CCDF Administrative Data linked to 
the Urban Institute’s CCDF Policies Database, this study examines whether lengthened 
eligibility periods affected parental income, work status, or educational enrollment. I find 
evidence that, on average, the policy change had no effect on parental income. At the same time, 
there was a 3.4 percentage point decrease in the share of parents reporting any income from 
employment activities and a 1.5 percentage point decrease in the average share of parents 
receiving a subsidy to engage in work activity. Taken together, these results suggest that parents 
who worked after the policy change did so at a higher wage and/or for more hours (since income 
was unchanged while employment declined), although unfortunately data on wages and hours 
are not available in the CCDF dataset. Notably, however, subgroup analysis shows that the 
policy change increased receipt of subsidy to engage in work activity by 4.7 percentage points 
among single-parent households, indicating that single-parent households responded differently 
than two-parent households to stable childcare arrangements. Finally, longer eligibility periods 
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increased parental enrollment in school by 3.3 percentage points. Thus, rather than leading 
directly to increased income and employment, the expansion of eligibility periods, with the 
assurance of increased stability in subsidy receipt, seems to have facilitated parental investment 
in human capital. This result could have positive long-term effects on household earnings and 
employment. 
 These results are striking, in that they run counter to much of the previous research 
regarding the effect of subsidy receipt on parental employment, while simultaneously 
contributing to a relatively new and limited literature on the relationship between childcare and 
parental education. Extant literature suggests that increased stability in subsidy receipt is 
associated with increased stability in employment (Forry and Hofferth, 2011), although it is more 
mixed when considering the relationship between subsidy receipt and income (Michalopoulos et 
al., 2011). Although I do not observe characteristics of parental employment, it is possible that 
parents who remained employed did so more stably or at a higher wage. Among parents who did 
not remain employed, my results suggest that they may have shifted from work into educational 
enrollment. 
It is also notable that much of the previous literature does not include parental education, 
which is a key outcome in this study. Although student parents face unique challenges, they also 
may be uniquely well-suited to benefit from childcare programs such as CCDF subsidies. 
Parental education may be better aligned with many childcare arrangements than employment is, 
as classroom hours often are stable and are quite similar to the standard hours in which most 
childcare arrangements are open (Sabol and Chase-Lansdale, 2015; Sommer et al., 2018); 
employment hours, however, can be both irregular and occur at nonstandard times. As many of 
the obstacles to degree completion for low-income students are logistical, solving the problem of 
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childcare logistics for student parents could have substantial positive impacts on parent 
educational attainment (Sommer et al., 2018).  
Herbst and Tekin (2011) provide evidence to support this theory, showing that when 
mothers receive subsidies it frees up time to invest in human capital by enrolling in school or 
training courses. Using data from the Early Child Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten (ECLS-K), 
they find that childcare subsidy recipients are 14.7 percentage points more likely to enroll in 
education or job training than their non-recipient peers. While the study provides much-needed 
evidence around childcare subsidy receipt and parental education outcomes, the measure of 
subsidy available in the ECLS-K is imprecise, and non-recipient peers may not be the correct 
counterfactual to subsidy recipients (Herbst, 2008; Johnson et al., 2011). 
Results from my analyses bring these strands of the subsidy literature together, finding 
that more stable subsidy arrangements have no effect on parental income and a negative effect on 
employment, while increasing parental schooling. It is possible that the effects on income and 
work are due to selection bias into the CCDF program: many parents who receive CCDF 
subsidies may have been already stably employed and/or higher earners prior to the expansion of 
the eligibility period. In particular, this would be expected if CCDF was not reaching new 
participants with the policy change, but rather changing the behavior of existing recipients. 
However, when viewed in the context of a 3.3 percentage point increase in the share of parents 
receiving a CCDF subsidy for education, the null or negative effects on work and income suggest 
that some parents made a trade-off between work and schooling. In other words, the expansion 
of eligibility periods may have facilitated parents entry into schooling—which tends to be a 
lengthier commitment than entry into a job, as most educational programs are at least one year—
with the assurance of increased stability in subsidy receipt for a minimum of 12 months. As 
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education is generally a short-term investment for long-term gains in income, supporting parents’ 
efforts to complete a degree may be beneficial to children and to household stability in the long 
run (Sabol and Chase-Lansdale, 2015). Future research should examine the long-run effects of 
this policy change on these outcomes, not only to measure degree completion but also to assess 
whether this increase in educational enrollment resulted in long-run economic mobility. 
  Results from this analysis should be viewed in light of several limitations. First, while I 
employ two sensitivity tests to examine how results differ with choice of counterfactual group, 
none of these groups is a perfect counterfactual to subsidy recipients. While my primary results 
assume that states that still maintain a 6-month eligibility period, even after the 2014 
reauthorization, provide the most appropriate counterfactual, these states may have policy 
environments that are particularly cumbersome or difficult for subsidy recipients to navigate. 
While all of these states implemented the 12-month eligibility period after the deadline 
established by the federal government (except Hawaii, which plans to do so in FFY 2020), it is 
unclear why they did not comply prior to the FFY 2016 deadline. My first sensitivity test, 
restricting the analysis to states that changed policies, is aimed at addressing this concern. 
Second, selection bias may arise from the use of CCDF Administrative Data, as only 
approximately 15 percent of income-eligible households apply for and/or receive CCDF 
subsidies (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Herbst, 2008). These families may be systematically 
different from nonrecipients in important ways, such as an ability to navigate administrative 
processes. Thus, these results are not generalizable to low-income families or to eligible families, 
but rather only to the population of families who receive subsidies. While I employ ACS data as 
a sensitivity check to address this potential for selection bias, these models likely capture a high 
number of eligible non-recipients and thus make it difficult to capture small effects, which may 
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account for a lack of precision within those results. Finally, while I employ a rich set of 
household-level and policy-level covariates from the linked Urban Institute CCDF Policies 
Database, these covariates may not account for all differences in policy environments or 
families. 
In conclusion, this study provides the first evidence on the effects of the longer subsidy 
periods due to CCDBG reauthorization on parental income, employment, and education. I 
provide evidence that, when parents are guaranteed 12 months of continuous childcare subsidies 
rather than 6 months, they are more likely to pursue education but may also decrease 
employment. This policy change may have positive long-term effects on families, as human 





Figure 3—1: Timing of changes in CCDF eligibility lengths 
 
Source: Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2015-2016 
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Figure 3—2: Stratified estimates by partner status 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. See notes to Table 1 for information on control 
variables. All models include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. n 
= 70,867 for no partner; n = 448,146 for partner. 
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Figure 3—3: Stratified estimates by race 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. See notes to Table 1 for information on control 
variables. All models include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. n 
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Figure 3—4: Stratified estimates by age of child 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. See notes to Table 1 for information on control 
variables. All models include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. n 
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Figure 3—5: Stratified estimates by type of childcare arrangement 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. See notes to Table 1 for information on control 
variables. All models include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. n 
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Tables 
Table 3—1: Estimated pre-treatment trends 
 













Pre-trend -6.336 -0.0003 -0.001 0.001 0.0004 
 (4.132) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.0003) 
   
   
Obs. 453,418 453,418 453,418 453,418 453,418 
R-squared 0.446 0.128 0.095 0.078 0.057 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. All models control for the following covariates 
from CCDF Administrative Data: family size, single parent status, childcare type, monthly hours 
spent in childcare, child age, child race, child sex and provider payment. All models control for 
the following characteristics from the Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database: income 
eligibility thresholds based on family size, continuing eligibility thresholds, maximum child age 
for eligibility, eligible parental activities to receive a subsidy, acceptable application methods, 
documentation required to authorize and verify eligibility, minimum family copayment amount, 
whether families in poverty have a copayment, and the copayment method. All models include 
state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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Table 3—2: Characteristics of parents in treatment and control states before and after a change 
in length of eligibility for CCDF subsidies 










Outcomes     
Income ($) 1737.81 1856.55** 1781.81 1603.59*** 
 (1041.64) (1194.35) (1078.53) (1101.87) 
Income from work (%) 0.870 0.870 0.858 0.904*** 
 (0.336) (0.336) (0.349) (0.295) 
Reason for care: work 0.851 0.966*** 0.840 0.874*** 
 (0.356) (0.182) (0.366) (0.332) 
Reason for care: school 0.065 0.021*** 0.078 0.053*** 
 (0.247) (0.143) (0.269) (0.223) 
Reason for care: both work  0.073 0.013*** 0.643 0.072*** 
     and school (0.261) (0.115) (0.245) (0.258) 
     
Household Characteristics     
Family size 3.649 3.590 3.776 3.888*** 
 (1.296) (1.264) (1.450) (1.532) 
Single parent household 0.902 0.919 0.862 0.873*** 
 (0.298) (0.272) (0.345) (0.333) 
Child age 5.182 5.407 5.183 5.613*** 
 (3.049) (3.116) (3.206) (3.274) 
Child race     
    White non-Hispanic 0.320 0.317*** 0.299 0.250*** 
 (0.466) (0.465) (0.458) (0.433) 
    Black non-Hispanic 0.335 0.378 0.430 0.467 
 (0.472) (0.485) (0.495) (0.499) 
    Hispanic 0.298 0.255*** 0.132 0.173*** 
 (0.458) (0.436) (0.339) (0.379) 
    Other 0.047 0.049* 0.138 0.110 
 (0.211) (0.217) (0.345) (0.312) 
Female child 0.491 0.481 0.495 0.495 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
     
Childcare Characteristics     
Provider payment per month  358.131 411.538 394.704 442.409*** 
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    ($) (187.575) (219.935) (240.424) (255.847) 
Care type     
    Center 0.739 0.711*** 0.483 0.535*** 
 (0.439) (0.453) (0.500) (0.499) 
    In child's home 0.023 0.038*** 0.124 0.104*** 
 (0.149) (0.192) (0.329) (0.305) 
    Family/group home 0.239 0.251 0.393 0.361*** 
 (0.426) (0.434) (0.488) (0.480) 
Hours per month in care 151.353 131.326*** 129.895 129.981*** 
 (71.047) (66.779) (52.895) (51.872) 
Copay for care ($) 116.875 135.287*** 75.846 85.624*** 
 (113.512) (112.788) (108.047) (104.454) 
     
Observations 289,311 21,521 163,560 44,621 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: Estimates represent weighted means (number of observations is unweighted). Standard 
deviations in parentheses. Treatment states are Connecticut, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Iowa, Arizona, Indiana, South Dakota, and Texas. Control states are Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Minnesota, and West Virginia. Significance asterisks represent difference between pre-
change and post-change values. 





Table 3—3: Estimated effect of CCDF eligibility length expansion on parent outcomes, 2009-
2016 
















Change 67.611  -0.034***  -0.015*  
 (45.718)  (0.010)  (0.006)  
Change, CT  -113.924  -0.014  -0.021* 
  (69.028)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Change, NV  143.115*  -0.019  0.022 
  (69.929)  (0.020)  (0.012) 
Change, OR  -109.028  -0.051**  -0.072*** 
   (97.024)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Change, PA  117.691*  -0.039**  -0.014 
   (58.711)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
Change, IA  -232.361***  -0.015  -0.001 
   (55.238)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Change, AZ  -185.455**  -0.013  0.008 
   (62.827)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Change, IN  164.707*  0.007  -0.012 
   (67.793)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Change, SD  -158.957**  -0.051***  -0.048*** 
   (48.848)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Change, TX  -31.598  -0.058***  -0.051*** 
   (47.182)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
       
Observations 519,013 519,013 519,013 519,013 519,013 519,013 
R-squared 0.523 0.511 0.121 0.121 0.108 0.108 
 
 










Change 0.033***  -0.018**  
 (0.004)  (0.006)  
Change, CT  0.035***  -0.004 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Change, NV  0.015  -0.035*** 
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  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Change, OR  0.088***  -0.003 
   (0.010)  (0.013) 
Change, PA  0.039***  -0.027*** 
   (0.005)  (0.007) 
Change, IA  -0.007  0.024*** 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
Change, AZ  -0.011  0.010 
   (0.006)  (0.009) 
Change, IN  -0.008  0.027*** 
   (0.005)  (0.008) 
Change, SD  0.027***  0.020* 
   (0.006)  (0.008) 
Change, TX  -0.002  0.011 
   (0.005)  (0.006) 
     
Observations 519,013 519,013 519,013 519,013 
R-squared 0.101 0. 101 0.051 0.051 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. See notes to Table 1 for information on control 
variables. All models include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. 
Treatment states are Connecticut (n=31,014), Nevada (n=32,913), Oregon (n=40,596), 
Pennsylvania (n=28,553), Iowa (n=39,757), Arizona (24,466), Indiana (44,575), South Dakota 
(31,337), and Texas (37,621). Control states are Alaska (n=29,890), Arkansas (31,423), Hawaii 
(36,686), Illinois (35,779), Minnesota (39,794), and West Virginia (34,609). 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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Appendix 
Table 3—A1:  Estimated pre-treatment trends, always states 
 











Pre-trend 3,904.484*** 0.472 0.920* 0.597 -0.909* 
 (730.537) (0.468) (0.363) (0.421) (0.424) 
      
Obs. 523,447 523,447 523,447 523,447 523,447 
R-squared 0.496 0.189 0.132 0.118 0.074 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. All models control for the following covariates 
from CCDF Administrative Data: family size, single parent status, childcare type, monthly hours 
spent in childcare, child age, child race, child sex and provider payment. All models control for 
the following characteristics from the Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database: income 
eligibility thresholds based on family size, continuing eligibility thresholds, maximum child age 
for eligibility, eligible parental activities to receive a subsidy, acceptable application methods, 
documentation required to authorize and verify eligibility, minimum family copayment amount, 
whether families in poverty have a copayment, and the copayment method. All models include 
state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table 3—A2: Control group sensitivity test: First differences with treatment states 




















(0.009)  (0.009) 
 
Change, CT  -59.904  -0.002  -0.007 
  (44.110)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Change, NV  -142.329*  0.016  -0.009 
  (61.592)  (0.015)  (0.011) 
Change, OR  -2.138  -0.025  -0.052* 
   (83.029)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
Change, PA  -41.322 
 -0.018  -0.016 
   (41.298)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Change, IA  -174.958**  -0.023*  0.001 
   (54.738)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Change, AZ  -291.343***  0.003  0.011 
   (55.092)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Change, IN  254.260***  0.027**  -0.006 
   (53.297)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Change, SD  -183.161***  -0.026*  -0.041*** 
   (33.833)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Change, TX  -49.737  -0.032**  -0.041*** 
   (29.288)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
       
Observations 311,321 311,321 311,321 311,321 311,321 311,321 
R-squared 0.536 0.536 0.137 0.137 0.121 0.121 
 
















Change, CT  0.025***  -0.015* 
  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Change, NV  0.017*  -0.011 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
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Change, OR  0.064***  -0.018 
   (0.012)  (0.015) 
Change, PA  0.038***  -0.016* 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
Change, IA  -0.015*  0.028*** 
   (0.006)  (0.008) 
Change, AZ  -0.001  0.001 
   (0.005)  (0.008) 
Change, IN  -0.001  0.013* 
   (0.005)  (0.006) 
Change, SD  0.030***  0.013 
   (0.006)  (0.007) 
Change, TX  -0.004  0.004 
   (0.005)  (0.005) 
     
Observations 311,321 311,321 311,321 311,321 
R-squared 0.120 0.120 0.050 0.050 
 
Source: CCDF Administrative Data and Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database, 2009-2016 
Notes: CCDF = Child Care Development Fund. See notes to Table 1 for information on control 
variables. All models include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table 3—A3: Estimated pre-treatment trends, ACS data 
 









Pre-trend 1.107 -0.007 -0.007 0.002 
 -24.516 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
   
  
Obs. 16,307 16,307 16,307 16,307 
R-squared 0.038 0.174 0.016 0.004 
 
Source: ACS, 2009-2017 
Notes: ACS=American Community Survey. All models control for the following covariates from 
ACS Data: family size, single parent status, child age, child race, and child sex. All models 
control for the following characteristics from the Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database: 
income eligibility thresholds based on family size, continuing eligibility thresholds, maximum 
child age for eligibility, eligible parental activities to receive a subsidy, acceptable application 
methods, documentation required to authorize and verify eligibility, minimum family copayment 
amount, whether families in poverty have a copayment, and the copayment method. All models 
include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-month level. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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Table 3—A4: ACS estimates of the effect of CCDF eligibility length expansion on parent 
outcomes 















          
Change 0.688  -0.017  0.020  
 (41.569)  (0.019)  (0.011)  
Change, CT  237.486  0.029  0.028 
  -252.136  -0.024  -0.024 
Change, NV  33.521  -0.089***  0.092*** 
  -84.094  -0.024  -0.025 
Change, OR  -84.19  -0.015  -0.081*** 
  -117.325  -0.014  -0.02 
Change, PA  -35.765  -0.017  -0.009 
  -108.917  -0.019  -0.03 
Change, IA  -91.375  -0.070**  -0.025 
  -62.598  -0.026  -0.038 
Change, AZ  -177.466***  -0.028**  0.073*** 
  -27.721  -0.009  -0.011 
Change, IN  151.303***  -0.028  0.027** 
  -27.567  -0.015  -0.01 
Change, SD  -444.343***  0.026  0.043 
  -115.375  -0.02  -0.029 
Change, TX  23.815  -0.002  0.026*** 
  -43.972  -0.007  -0.004 
       
Observations 25,050 25,050 25,050 25,050 25,050 25,050 
R-squared 0.032 0.032 0.014 0.014 0.162 0.162 
 






    
Change 0.002  
 (0.003)  
Change, CT  0.056* 
  -0.022 
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Change, NV  -0.011 
  -0.01 
Change, OR  -0.014** 
  -0.005 
Change, PA  0.001 
  -0.008 
Change, IA  -0.027 
  -0.015 
Change, AZ  -0.001 
  -0.004 
Change, IN  -0.005 
  -0.003 
Change, SD  0.034** 
  -0.011 
Change, TX  0.004** 
  -0.001 
   
Observations 25,050 25,050 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 
 
 
Source: American Community Survey, 2009-2017 
Notes: ACS= American Community Survey. All models control for the following covariates 
from ACS Data: family size, single parent status, child age, child race, and child sex. All models 
control for the following characteristics from the Urban Institute CCDF Policies Database: 
income eligibility thresholds based on family size, continuing eligibility thresholds, maximum 
child age for eligibility, eligible parental activities to receive a subsidy, acceptable application 
methods, documentation required to authorize and verify eligibility, minimum family copayment 
amount, whether families in poverty have a copayment, and the copayment method. All models 
include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at state-year level. 




Childcare instability is common. Nearly 40 percent of infants experience a change in 
childcare between 6 and 15 months of age (Tran and Weinraub, 2006), and over half of low-
income families experience instability in care (Chaudry, 2004; Grobe et al., 2008; Lowe et al., 
2005). This instability has detrimental effects both on children and on parents, and low-income 
families are disproportionately affected. The goal of this dissertation is to better understand the 
household-level factors linked to childcare instability, and to examine the effect of two childcare 
programs, both of which ideally provide more stable arrangements, on parental outcomes.  
In this dissertation, I build on extant literature by examining the relationship between 
childcare instability, household instability, and parental outcomes, finding that negative 
household changes increase the risk of childcare instability and that the federal childcare subsidy 
program has a larger effect on parents—particularly low-income parents—than New York City’s 
universal pre-kindergarten program.  
Implications for Social Work Policy and Practice 
In an era of increasing federal and state budget constraints, especially for social 
programs, these findings are particularly salient for policymakers. While there has been growing 
conversation in recent years at all levels of government regarding the best ways to support 
working families, scarce legislation has been passed or implemented to do so—particularly at the 
federal level. Findings from this dissertation support the provision of stable childcare 
arrangements for low-income families, and particularly the adequate funding of the Child Care 
and Development Fund subsidy program. This program is dramatically underfunded in most 
states, resulting in long waiting lists for eligible families. Increasing funding of this program not 
only would provide more stable care arrangements for low-income families—who experience 
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greater rates of negative household instability and therefore may be at greater risk for childcare 
instability—but it also may have long-term benefits for families who choose to invest in human 
capital as a result of subsidy receipt. 
Researchers and policymakers have debated whether targeted or universal programs, 
including childcare provision, are better for families. Some have argued that targeted programs 
are more effective at aiding those who are disadvantaged (Kottelenberg and Lehrer, 2017). 
Indeed, programs such as Head Start widely are accepted to be beneficial for low-income 
children and their parents (Sabol and Chase-Lansdale, 2015) and are often a focal point of plans 
to improve the childcare system in America (Chaudry et al., 2017; Sommer et al., 2018). Aligned 
with prior literature on the positive relationship between targeted childcare programs and 
parental investment in human capital (Herbst and Tekin, 2011; Sabol and Chase-Lansdale, 
2015), results from this dissertation suggest that childcare subsidies for low-income families may 
have implications for long-run economic mobility, and thus support the investment in targeted 
programs such as CCDF. Subsidies are particularly valuable in that they can reach children up to 
age 13, unlike many preschool programs that do not start until children are 3 or 4 years old. 
However, a notable downside of targeted programs is the potential for stigma. Families may 
choose not to engaged in means-test programs, or policymakers may be less inclined to fund 
these programs at adequate levels, if there is an attached negative sentiment toward low-income 
families.  
In this way, universal programs may be particularly attractive to policymakers concerned 
with equity. While it remains to be seen whether the current and planned changes to New York 
City’s universal program—including the addition of preschool for 3-year-old children—will 
achieve the goal of leveling the playing field for parents, prior research indicates that the 
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program already has had positive health effects on low-income New York children (Hong et al., 
2017). As further improvements are made to UPK, it is possible that low-income parents may 
begin to see greater benefits from the city’s universal program. For example, the planned 
expansion of the 3-K program to all New York families may better support parental employment 
or education by providing an additional year of care. Further, the NYC Department of Education 
has signaled intent to provide increased funding for more full-day and year-round UPK seats 
(Murphy, 2019), which could increase stability for families and provide greater opportunity for 
parents.   
Future research should explore the long-term effects of both the 2014 reauthorization of 
the Child Care and Development Fund and of the New York City UPK program (including the 
expansion of the 3-K program), and it should seek to understand how parents make decisions to 
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